[OpenWrt-Devel] IPv6 firewall and Port Control Protocol (Was: Barrier Breaker 14.07-rc1)

Gui Iribarren gui at altermundi.net
Thu Jul 17 22:01:58 EDT 2014


On 17/07/14 21:03, David Lang wrote:
> I know that IPv6 designers pine for the "good old days" of the Internet
> when no security was needed.
> 
> But the reality is that hackers and worms have shown that leaving
> systems exposed to the Internet is just a Bad Idea.
> 
> As such, the idea that IPv6 would "restore" the "everyone can connect to
> everyone on any port" of the early '80s was wishful thinking at best.
> 
> link-local addressing isn't a good idea, because the average home will
> have three separate links (wired plus two bands of wireless), these can
> get bridged together, but that causes problems as well.
> 
> There is no answer here that will satisfy everyone.
> 
> But do you really want to see the news stories about how anyone running
> openwrt is vulnerable to $lastest_windows_exploit but people running
> stock firmware aren't?

Hello, thanks for joining the conversation,

you might have not spotted this email
https://lists.openwrt.org/pipermail/openwrt-devel/2014-July/026813.html

as it is now, the situation is actually the opposite of what you're
describing, it's more like: "Hey, my VoIP calls are failing, as well as
PopcornTime videos, since I installed OpenWRT. They were working just
fine with stock TPLink firmware"

Have you got any examples of stock firmware that blocks incoming traffic
by default?
In this discussion I have only seen talk of two that don't.


cheers!

> 
> Yes, it would be ideal if every host was locked down so that it was safe
> for them to be exposed.
> 
> But that's not the world we live in.
> 
> David Lang
> 
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2014, Lyme Marionette wrote:
> 
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:10:53 PM "Gui Iribarren"
>> <gui at altermundi.net> wrote:
>>> Benjamin is giving some great examples of real-world scenarios where
>>> an
>>> default-open firewall simplifies administration,
>>> and where a default-closed firewall would be not only unnecessary
>>> (provides no benefits), but would indeed complicate setting up
>>> things.
>>
>> There have been many good arguments posted on this subject and to
>> throw my opinion in, it a question of effort and expectations.
>>
>> I think everyone can agree that:
>> -It takes equal effort to turn a firewall on, as it does to turn one off.
>> -It takes equal effort to create a specific block list, as it does to
>> create a specific allow list.
>> -UPnP is not included by default for either the ipv4 or ipv6 stacks.
>>
>> I would also go further to suggest that:
>> -Consistency is good, even if it consistent for superficial reasons.
>>
>> We know that, for NAT reasons, that the ipv4 stack by default blocks
>> incoming connections:
>> -Because it doesn't know by default where to route them.
>> -ipv4 end-points have been traditionally insecure.
>>
>> The two ways to get around this (for gaming, etc):
>> -Through setting firewall rules to route the traffic to an end-point.
>> -Through the use of UPnP (which is used by most games to host, and
>> gaming consoles).
>>
>> With the adoption of ipv6 there is the opportunity to change this
>> behaviour such that instead of incoming traffic being restricted for
>> technical reasons, that incoming traffic is routed to the correct
>> end-point.
>> However, that begs the questions:
>> A) Is that consistent with what people would expect?
>> B) Are ipv6 end-points secure by design?
>>
>> In regards to A, from the mindset of a non-technical user, would wager
>> that the answer is 'no'. Even though there is a change in technology
>> with ipv6, the ipv6 technology fulfills the same role as ipv4 and this
>> could be seen as opposing direction between the two. This would likely
>> catch many end-users by surprize unless they read the small print
>> regarding this.
>>
>> As for B, given my view of software development, applications,
>> networks, etc (I've been in the IT business for over 25 years now) I
>> would wager that 80% of applications are secure, and that the 0ther
>> 20% make the potential change in policy very risky.
>>
>> IMO, which others may disagree with, would be to include UPnP by
>> default which would/should resolve most of the hosting issues.
>>
>> Thanks.
>> _______________________________________________
>> openwrt-devel mailing list
>> openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
>> https://lists.openwrt.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openwrt-devel
>>
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