[PATCH -next] riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection
tongtiangen
tongtiangen at huawei.com
Sun Jun 20 19:36:58 PDT 2021
On 2021/6/17 12:55, Palmer Dabbelt wrote:
> On Fri, 11 Jun 2021 20:55:45 PDT (-0700), Palmer Dabbelt wrote:
>> On Thu, 03 Jun 2021 05:49:54 PDT (-0700), tongtiangen at huawei.com wrote:
>>> Hi Paul & Palmer & Albert :
>>>
>>> kindly ping...
>>
>> Sorry about that. I remember having read this before, I'm not sure what
>> happened though. It's on for-next now.
>
> This fails my tests for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=n, which is probably why
> didn't get around to merging it in the first place.
> Sorry to flip-flop on you here, but I'm going to pull this off
> for-next. I know I've done that a few times lately, it's not how I'd
> like to be doing things but this cycle just ended up in a lot of
> distractions.
Hi, Palmer:
I have fixed this problem (tests fail if STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=n) ，I'll
issue a new version of the patch later.
Here's another problem I need to explain：
The introduction of this patch led to the failure of vmap stack
detection : https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1439132/
, and this problem is fix by:
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1448863/
Thanks.
>
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2021/5/24 21:54, tongtiangen wrote:
>>>> This patch adds stack overflow detection to riscv, usable when
>>>> CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.
>>>>
>>>> Overflow is detected in kernel exception entry(kernel/entry.S), if
>>>> the kernel
>>>> stack is overflow and been detected, the overflow handler is
>>>> invoked on a
>>>> per-cpu overflow stack. This approach preserves GPRs and the
>>>> original exception
>>>> information.
>>>>
>>>> The overflow detect is performed before any attempt is made to
>>>> access the stack
>>>> and the principle of stack overflow detection: kernel stacks are
>>>> aligned to
>>>> double their size, enabling overflow to be detected with a single
>>>> bit test. For
>>>> example, a 16K stack is aligned to 32K, ensuring that bit 14 of the
>>>> SP must be
>>>> zero. On an overflow (or underflow), this bit is flipped. Thus,
>>>> overflow (of
>>>> less than the size of the stack) can be detected by testing whether
>>>> this bit is
>>>> set.
>>>>
>>>> This gives us a useful error message on stack overflow, as can be
>>>> trigger with
>>>> the LKDTM overflow test:
>>>>
>>>> [ 388.053267] lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXHAUST_STACK
>>>> [ 388.053663] lkdtm: Calling function with 1024 frame size to
>>>> depth 32 ...
>>>> [ 388.054016] lkdtm: loop 32/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.054186] lkdtm: loop 31/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.054491] lkdtm: loop 30/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.054672] lkdtm: loop 29/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.054859] lkdtm: loop 28/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.055010] lkdtm: loop 27/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.055163] lkdtm: loop 26/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.055309] lkdtm: loop 25/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.055481] lkdtm: loop 24/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.055653] lkdtm: loop 23/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.055837] lkdtm: loop 22/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.056015] lkdtm: loop 21/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.056188] lkdtm: loop 20/32 ...
>>>> [ 388.058145] Insufficient stack space to handle exception!
>>>> [ 388.058153] Task stack: [0xffffffd014260000..0xffffffd014264000]
>>>> [ 388.058160] Overflow stack:
>>>> [0xffffffe1f8d2c220..0xffffffe1f8d2d220]
>>>> [ 388.058168] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted
>>>> 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90
>>>> [ 388.058175] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
>>>> [ 388.058187] epc : number+0x32/0x2c0
>>>> [ 388.058247] ra : vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0
>>>> [ 388.058255] epc : ffffffe0002d38f6 ra : ffffffe0002d814e sp :
>>>> ffffffd01425ffc0
>>>> [ 388.058263] gp : ffffffe0012e4010 tp : ffffffe08014da00 t0 :
>>>> ffffffd0142606e8
>>>> [ 388.058271] t1 : 0000000000000000 t2 : 0000000000000000 s0 :
>>>> ffffffd014260070
>>>> [ 388.058303] s1 : ffffffd014260158 a0 : ffffffd01426015e a1 :
>>>> ffffffd014260158
>>>> [ 388.058311] a2 : 0000000000000013 a3 : ffff0a01ffffff10 a4 :
>>>> ffffffe000c398e0
>>>> [ 388.058319] a5 : 511b02ec65f3e300 a6 : 0000000000a1749a a7 :
>>>> 0000000000000000
>>>> [ 388.058327] s2 : ffffffff000000ff s3 : 00000000ffff0a01 s4 :
>>>> ffffffe0012e50a8
>>>> [ 388.058335] s5 : 0000000000ffff0a s6 : ffffffe0012e50a8 s7 :
>>>> ffffffe000da1cc0
>>>> [ 388.058343] s8 : ffffffffffffffff s9 : ffffffd0142602b0 s10:
>>>> ffffffd0142602a8
>>>> [ 388.058351] s11: ffffffd01426015e t3 : 00000000000f0000 t4 :
>>>> ffffffffffffffff
>>>> [ 388.058359] t5 : 000000000000002f t6 : ffffffd014260158
>>>> [ 388.058366] status: 0000000000000100 badaddr: ffffffd01425fff8
>>>> cause: 000000000000000f
>>>> [ 388.058374] Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow
>>>> [ 388.058381] CPU: 0 PID: 89 Comm: bash Not tainted
>>>> 5.12.0-rc8-dirty #90
>>>> [ 388.058387] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
>>>> [ 388.058393] Call Trace:
>>>> [ 388.058400] [<ffffffe000004944>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xce
>>>> [ 388.058406] [<ffffffe0006f0b28>] dump_backtrace+0x38/0x46
>>>> [ 388.058412] [<ffffffe0006f0b46>] show_stack+0x10/0x18
>>>> [ 388.058418] [<ffffffe0006f3690>] dump_stack+0x74/0x8e
>>>> [ 388.058424] [<ffffffe0006f0d52>] panic+0xfc/0x2b2
>>>> [ 388.058430] [<ffffffe0006f0acc>] print_trace_address+0x0/0x24
>>>> [ 388.058436] [<ffffffe0002d814e>] vsnprintf+0x2ae/0x3f0
>>>> [ 388.058956] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen at huawei.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> Change since rfc: fix rv32 and nommu defconfig compile error.
>>>>
>>>> arch/riscv/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>> arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 15 ++++
>>>> arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 108
>>>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>> arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 35 +++++++++
>>>> 4 files changed, 159 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
>>>> index c426e7d20907..3e9c1945524d 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
>>>> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ config RISCV
>>>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU
>>>> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>>>> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
>>>> + select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if MMU && 64BIT
>>>> select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS
>>>> select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
>>>> select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
>>>> b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
>>>> index 0e549a3089b3..60da0dcacf14 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
>>>> @@ -19,6 +19,21 @@
>>>> #endif
>>>> #define THREAD_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE << THREAD_SIZE_ORDER)
>>>>
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * By aligning VMAP'd stacks to 2 * THREAD_SIZE, we can detect
>>>> overflow by
>>>> + * checking sp & (1 << THREAD_SHIFT), which we can do cheaply in
>>>> the entry
>>>> + * assembly.
>>>> + */
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>>> +#define THREAD_ALIGN (2 * THREAD_SIZE)
>>>> +#else
>>>> +#define THREAD_ALIGN THREAD_SIZE
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +
>>>> +#define THREAD_SHIFT (PAGE_SHIFT + THREAD_SIZE_ORDER)
>>>> +#define OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE SZ_4K
>>>> +#define SHADOW_OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE (1024)
>>>> +
>>>> #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
>>>>
>>>> #include <asm/processor.h>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
>>>> index 80d5a9e017b0..98f502654edd 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
>>>> @@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ ENTRY(handle_exception)
>>>> _restore_kernel_tpsp:
>>>> csrr tp, CSR_SCRATCH
>>>> REG_S sp, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
>>>> +
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>>> + addi sp, sp, -(PT_SIZE_ON_STACK)
>>>> + srli sp, sp, THREAD_SHIFT
>>>> + andi sp, sp, 0x1
>>>> + bnez sp, handle_kernel_stack_overflow
>>>> + REG_L sp, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +
>>>> _save_context:
>>>> REG_S sp, TASK_TI_USER_SP(tp)
>>>> REG_L sp, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
>>>> @@ -376,6 +385,105 @@ handle_syscall_trace_exit:
>>>> call do_syscall_trace_exit
>>>> j ret_from_exception
>>>>
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>>> +handle_kernel_stack_overflow:
>>>> + la sp, shadow_stack
>>>> + addi sp, sp, SHADOW_OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE
>>>> +
>>>> + //save caller register to shadow stack
>>>> + addi sp, sp, -(PT_SIZE_ON_STACK)
>>>> + REG_S x1, PT_RA(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x5, PT_T0(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x6, PT_T1(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x7, PT_T2(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x10, PT_A0(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x11, PT_A1(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x12, PT_A2(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x13, PT_A3(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x14, PT_A4(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x15, PT_A5(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x16, PT_A6(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x17, PT_A7(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x28, PT_T3(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x29, PT_T4(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x30, PT_T5(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x31, PT_T6(sp)
>>>> +
>>>> + la ra, restore_caller_reg
>>>> + tail get_overflow_stack
>>>> +
>>>> +restore_caller_reg:
>>>> + //save per-cpu overflow stack
>>>> + REG_S a0, -8(sp)
>>>> + //restore caller register from shadow_stack
>>>> + REG_L x1, PT_RA(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x5, PT_T0(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x6, PT_T1(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x7, PT_T2(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x10, PT_A0(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x11, PT_A1(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x12, PT_A2(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x13, PT_A3(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x14, PT_A4(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x15, PT_A5(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x16, PT_A6(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x17, PT_A7(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x28, PT_T3(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x29, PT_T4(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x30, PT_T5(sp)
>>>> + REG_L x31, PT_T6(sp)
>>>> +
>>>> + //load per-cpu overflow stack
>>>> + REG_L sp, -8(sp)
>>>> + addi sp, sp, -(PT_SIZE_ON_STACK)
>>>> +
>>>> + //save context to overflow stack
>>>> + REG_S x1, PT_RA(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x3, PT_GP(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x5, PT_T0(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x6, PT_T1(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x7, PT_T2(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x8, PT_S0(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x9, PT_S1(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x10, PT_A0(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x11, PT_A1(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x12, PT_A2(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x13, PT_A3(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x14, PT_A4(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x15, PT_A5(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x16, PT_A6(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x17, PT_A7(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x18, PT_S2(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x19, PT_S3(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x20, PT_S4(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x21, PT_S5(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x22, PT_S6(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x23, PT_S7(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x24, PT_S8(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x25, PT_S9(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x26, PT_S10(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x27, PT_S11(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x28, PT_T3(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x29, PT_T4(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x30, PT_T5(sp)
>>>> + REG_S x31, PT_T6(sp)
>>>> +
>>>> + REG_L s0, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
>>>> + csrr s1, CSR_STATUS
>>>> + csrr s2, CSR_EPC
>>>> + csrr s3, CSR_TVAL
>>>> + csrr s4, CSR_CAUSE
>>>> + csrr s5, CSR_SCRATCH
>>>> + REG_S s0, PT_SP(sp)
>>>> + REG_S s1, PT_STATUS(sp)
>>>> + REG_S s2, PT_EPC(sp)
>>>> + REG_S s3, PT_BADADDR(sp)
>>>> + REG_S s4, PT_CAUSE(sp)
>>>> + REG_S s5, PT_TP(sp)
>>>> + move a0, sp
>>>> + tail handle_bad_stack
>>>> +#endif
>>>> +
>>>> END(handle_exception)
>>>>
>>>> ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
>>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
>>>> index 0721b9798595..3f7f618dab42 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c
>>>> @@ -198,3 +198,38 @@ int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long pc)
>>>> void __init trap_init(void)
>>>> {
>>>> }
>>>> +
>>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>>> +DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long [OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE/sizeof(long)],
>>>> overflow_stack)
>>>> + __aligned(16);
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * shadow stack, handled_ kernel_ stack_ overflow(in
>>>> kernel/entry.S) is used
>>>> + * to get per-cpu overflow stack(get_overflow_stack).
>>>> + */
>>>> +long shadow_stack[SHADOW_OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE/sizeof(long)];
>>>> +asmlinkage unsigned long get_overflow_stack(void)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return (unsigned long)this_cpu_ptr(overflow_stack) +
>>>> + OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +asmlinkage void handle_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>> +{
>>>> + unsigned long tsk_stk = (unsigned long)current->stack;
>>>> + unsigned long ovf_stk = (unsigned
>>>> long)this_cpu_ptr(overflow_stack);
>>>> +
>>>> + console_verbose();
>>>> +
>>>> + pr_emerg("Insufficient stack space to handle exception!\n");
>>>> + pr_emerg("Task stack: [0x%016lx..0x%016lx]\n",
>>>> + tsk_stk, tsk_stk + THREAD_SIZE);
>>>> + pr_emerg("Overflow stack: [0x%016lx..0x%016lx]\n",
>>>> + ovf_stk, ovf_stk + OVERFLOW_STACK_SIZE);
>>>> +
>>>> + __show_regs(regs);
>>>> + panic("Kernel stack overflow");
>>>> +
>>>> + for (;;)
>>>> + wait_for_interrupt();
>>>> +}
>>>> +#endif
> .
>
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