OMAP3 L2/outer cache enabled in kernel (after being disabled by uBoot)?

Aneesh V aneesh at ti.com
Tue Jan 17 07:01:28 EST 2012


Santosh, Russel,

On Monday 16 January 2012 06:52 PM, Shilimkar, Santosh wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 2:13 PM, Russell King - ARM Linux
> <linux at arm.linux.org.uk>  wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 01:43:03PM +0100, Shilimkar, Santosh wrote:
>>> This code will be in assembly and that's what I have
>>> been using. Not having stack shoudn't be a blocker
>>> and can be work-around in this code. And this API
>>> has to be anyway called before MMU is enabled.
>>
>> What about SMC on OMAP potentially corrupting most of the integer
>> registers?  What if it corrupts an integer register which we depend
>> upon?  You don't have a stack here to save those registers.  We'd
>> need at least one additional register to save the old 'lr' value.
>>
> That's right.
>
>> What about other secure monitors?  Some implementations require you to
>> give parameters via memory.  How do you obtain that memory that early
>> on in the kernel boot (you haven't parsed anything here.)
>>
>> Not only that but you're asking to make the kernel boot a _lot_ more
>> fragile, when people start stuffing all kinds of utter shite into this
>> hook - and then we're burdened again with the old 'my kernel won't
>> boot and it remains silent, well your debug code is utter shite get rid
>> of it' crap that we used to have in the early 2000s.
>>
>> I really don't want to go anywhere near that situation.
>>
> Fair point. It will be harder to maintain and won't be consistent.
>
>>> Am not sure what you mean because secure API
>>> as such isn't a problem. If you mean one standard interface
>>> for all the ARM SOC's then that's something won't be
>>> easy to handled because it is tied up the security architecture
>>> which can vary across SoCs.
>>
>> The latter.  This is exactly the kind of pain I forsaw with this security
>> shite, and when I heard about it I was utterly dismayed at ARM Ltd for
>> coming up with such a brain-dead lack of design here.
>>
>> You're having to struggle with the results of that by having lots of
>> SoC specific hooks all around the place to fiddle with this that and the
>> other.  Your need to have something called from the early assembly code
>> is just yet more of that disease caused by ARM Ltd's lack of forsight
>> on this matter.
>>
>> I have no solution for you on this
>
> I managed use some secure macro kind of code but as you said it
> will be really hard to maintain.
>
> So we are stuck with this issue then.

Can't we delay the L2 initialization a bit and do it when we have a
stack, like we do in OMAP4 (early_initcall)? Am I missing something?

br,
Aneesh



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