[PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements

[Andrew Cooper]

On 12/05/2023 8:12 pm, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 08:17:21PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> On Fri, May 12 2023 at 17:13, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 03:24:04PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>>> On Fri, May 12 2023 at 12:28, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>>>>> Unless we assert that SHA-1 events are unsupported, it seems a bit odd 
>>>>> to force a policy on people who have both banks enabled. People with 
>>>>> mixed fleets are potentially going to be dealing with SHA-1 measurements 
>>>>> for a while yet, and while there's obviously a security benefit in using 
>>>>> SHA-2 instead it'd be irritating to have to maintain two attestation 
>>>>> policies.
>>>> Why?
>>>>
>>>> If you have a mixed fleet then it's not too much asked to provide two
>>>> data sets. On a TPM2 system you can enforce SHA-2 and only fallback to
>>>> SHA-1 on TPM 1.2 hardware. No?
>>> No, beause having TPM2 hardware doesn't guarantee that your firmware 
>>> enables SHA-2 (which also means this is something that could change with 
>>> firmware updates, which means that refusing to support SHA-1 if the 
>>> SHA-2 banks are enabled could result in an entirely different policy 
>>> being required (and plausibly one that isn't implemented in their 
>>> existing tooling)
>> It's not rocket science to have both variants supported in tooling,
>> really.
> People who are currently using tboot are only getting SHA-1, so there's 
> no obvious reason for them to have added support yet. *My* tooling all 
> supports SHA-2 so I'm completely fine here, but either we refuse to 
> support a bunch of hardware or we have to support SHA-1 anyway, and if 
> we have to support it the only reason not to implement it even in the 
> "SHA-2 is supported" case is because we have opinions about how other 
> people implement their security.

The way to deal with this is to merge DRTM support (when it's ready of
course) so people have an option which isn't tboot.

Then warn on finding a TPM2 without SHA-2, and make it a failure for
https://fwupd.github.io/libfwupdplugin/hsi.html#tpm-20-present etc, and
eventually the vendors will decide that the easiest way to avoid getting
a cross in their customers UIs is to implement SHA-2 support properly.

~Andrew