[PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements

[Matthew Garrett]

On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 08:17:21PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Fri, May 12 2023 at 17:13, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Fri, May 12, 2023 at 03:24:04PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> >> On Fri, May 12 2023 at 12:28, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> >> > Unless we assert that SHA-1 events are unsupported, it seems a bit odd 
> >> > to force a policy on people who have both banks enabled. People with 
> >> > mixed fleets are potentially going to be dealing with SHA-1 measurements 
> >> > for a while yet, and while there's obviously a security benefit in using 
> >> > SHA-2 instead it'd be irritating to have to maintain two attestation 
> >> > policies.
> >> 
> >> Why?
> >> 
> >> If you have a mixed fleet then it's not too much asked to provide two
> >> data sets. On a TPM2 system you can enforce SHA-2 and only fallback to
> >> SHA-1 on TPM 1.2 hardware. No?
> >
> > No, beause having TPM2 hardware doesn't guarantee that your firmware 
> > enables SHA-2 (which also means this is something that could change with 
> > firmware updates, which means that refusing to support SHA-1 if the 
> > SHA-2 banks are enabled could result in an entirely different policy 
> > being required (and plausibly one that isn't implemented in their 
> > existing tooling)
> 
> It's not rocket science to have both variants supported in tooling,
> really.

People who are currently using tboot are only getting SHA-1, so there's 
no obvious reason for them to have added support yet. *My* tooling all 
supports SHA-2 so I'm completely fine here, but either we refuse to 
support a bunch of hardware or we have to support SHA-1 anyway, and if 
we have to support it the only reason not to implement it even in the 
"SHA-2 is supported" case is because we have opinions about how other 
people implement their security.