[PATCH 2/4] efi: loader: validate section raw data bounds against image size

[Ahmad Fatoum]

On 4/13/26 2:36 PM, Sascha Hauer wrote:
> From: Sascha Hauer <sascha at saschahauer.de>
> 
> When loading PE sections, PointerToRawData and SizeOfRawData from the
> section header are used to memcpy from the input image without checking
> that the source region fits within the image buffer. A crafted PE with
> PointerToRawData pointing near the end of the file causes a read past
> the input buffer.
> 
> Use size_add() for the bounds check so that the addition saturates to
> SIZE_MAX on overflow instead of wrapping, which would bypass the check
> on 32-bit architectures where unsigned long is 32 bits.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer at pengutronix.de>
> 
> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply at anthropic.com>

Reviewed-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum at pengutronix.de>

> ---
>  efi/loader/pe.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/efi/loader/pe.c b/efi/loader/pe.c
> index 7c5aaa1f91..3190718df5 100644
> --- a/efi/loader/pe.c
> +++ b/efi/loader/pe.c
> @@ -706,6 +706,11 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle,
>  			memset(efi_reloc + sec->VirtualAddress, 0,
>  			       sec->Misc.VirtualSize);
>  		}
> +		if (size_add(sec->PointerToRawData, copy_size) > efi_size) {
> +			pr_err("Section %d exceeds image size\n", i);
> +			ret = EFI_LOAD_ERROR;
> +			goto err;
> +		}
>  		memcpy(efi_reloc + sec->VirtualAddress,
>  		       efi + sec->PointerToRawData,
>  		       copy_size);

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