[PATCH 2/2] net: dns: fix OOB read in dns_recv query type check
Sascha Hauer
s.hauer at pengutronix.de
Thu Apr 2 01:25:10 PDT 2026
After skipping the query name in a DNS response, dns_recv() reads
p[1] and p[2] to check the query type BEFORE validating that these
offsets are within the packet bounds. The bounds check '&p[5] > e'
follows the reads, but by then the OOB access has already occurred.
If the query name's null terminator is at or near the end of the
packet, p[1] and p[2] read 1-2 bytes past the packet data.
Fix by moving the bounds check before the reads.
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer at pengutronix.de>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply at anthropic.com>
---
net/dns.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/dns.c b/net/dns.c
index fde1439469..5a3ee30720 100644
--- a/net/dns.c
+++ b/net/dns.c
@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@ static void dns_recv(struct header *header, unsigned len)
continue;
/* We sent query class 1, query type 1 */
+ if (&p[5] > e) {
+ pr_debug("DNS response too short\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
tmp = p[1] | (p[2] << 8);
- if (&p[5] > e || ntohs(tmp) != DNS_A_RECORD) {
+ if (ntohs(tmp) != DNS_A_RECORD) {
pr_debug("DNS response was not A record\n");
return;
}
--
2.47.3
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