[PATCH 4/4] riscv: Enable perf counters user access only through perf

[Atish Patra]

On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 6:55 PM Andrew Jones <ajones at ventanamicro.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 03:17:01PM +0200, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 26, 2023 at 2:57 PM Andrew Jones <ajones at ventanamicro.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2023 at 06:17:25PM +0200, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
> > > > We used to unconditionnally expose the cycle and instret csrs to
> > > > userspace, which gives rise to security concerns.
> > > >
> > > > So only allow access to hw counters from userspace through the perf
> > > > framework which will handle context switchs, per-task events...etc. But
> > > > as we cannot break userspace, we give the user the choice to go back to
> > > > the previous behaviour by setting the sysctl perf_user_access.
> > > >
> > > > We also introduce a means to directly map the hardware counters to
> > > > userspace, thus avoiding the need for syscalls whenever an application
> > > > wants to access counters values.
> > > >
> > > > Note that arch_perf_update_userpage is a copy of arm64 code.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti at rivosinc.com>
> > > > ---
> > > >  Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst |  23 +++-
> > > >  arch/riscv/include/asm/perf_event.h         |   3 +
> > > >  arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile                  |   2 +-
> > > >  arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c              |  65 +++++++++++
> > > >  drivers/perf/riscv_pmu.c                    |  42 ++++++++
> > > >  drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_legacy.c             |  17 +++
> > > >  drivers/perf/riscv_pmu_sbi.c                | 113 ++++++++++++++++++--
> > > >  include/linux/perf/riscv_pmu.h              |   3 +
> > > >  tools/lib/perf/mmap.c                       |  65 +++++++++++
> > > >  9 files changed, 322 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> > > >  create mode 100644 arch/riscv/kernel/perf_event.c
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> > > > index 4b7bfea28cd7..02b2a40a3647 100644
> > > > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> > > > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> > > > @@ -941,16 +941,31 @@ enabled, otherwise writing to this file will return ``-EBUSY``.
> > > >  The default value is 8.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > -perf_user_access (arm64 only)
> > > > -=================================
> > > > +perf_user_access (arm64 and riscv only)
> > > > +=======================================
> > > > +
> > > > +Controls user space access for reading perf event counters.
> > > >
> > > > -Controls user space access for reading perf event counters. When set to 1,
> > > > -user space can read performance monitor counter registers directly.
> > > > +arm64
> > > > +=====
> > > >
> > > >  The default value is 0 (access disabled).
> > > > +When set to 1, user space can read performance monitor counter registers
> > > > +directly.
> > > >
> > > >  See Documentation/arm64/perf.rst for more information.
> > > >
> > > > +riscv
> > > > +=====
> > > > +
> > > > +When set to 0, user access is disabled.
> > > > +
> > > > +When set to 1, user space can read performance monitor counter registers
> > > > +directly only through perf, any direct access without perf intervention will
> > > > +trigger an illegal instruction.
> > > > +
> > > > +The default value is 2, it enables the legacy mode, that is user space has
> > > > +direct access to cycle, time and insret CSRs only.
> > >
> > > I think this default value should be a Kconfig symbol, allowing kernels to
> > > be built with a secure default.
> >
> > Actually I was more in favor of having the default to 1 (ie the secure
> > option) and let the distros deal with the legacy mode (via a sysctl
> > parameter on the command line) as long as user-space has not been
> > fixed: does that make sense?
>
> Yes, I'd prefer that too. I assumed the default was 2 in this patch
> because we couldn't set it to 1 for some reason.
>

I would prefer that too. However, it was set to 2 because it would break
the user space application depending on the legacy behavior as soon as the
patches are upstream. That is the reason
palmer suggested keeping the default value to 2 in order to avoid that.

+distro folks (cc'd)
If the distro maintainer can confirm that this would be a non-issue, I am okay
with setting the default to 1.


> Thanks,
> drew



-- 
Regards,
Atish