[PATCH 07/12] nvme: Implement In-Band authentication
Hannes Reinecke
hare at suse.de
Tue Nov 16 02:40:12 PST 2021
On 11/16/21 11:25 AM, Sagi Grimberg wrote:
>
>
> On 11/12/21 2:59 PM, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
>> Implement NVMe-oF In-Band authentication according to NVMe TPAR 8006.
>> This patch adds two new fabric options 'dhchap_secret' to specify the
>> pre-shared key (in ASCII respresentation according to NVMe 2.0 section
>> 8.13.5.8 'Secret representation') and 'dhchap_ctrl_secret' to specify
>> the pre-shared controller key for bi-directional authentication of both
>> the host and the controller.
>> Re-authentication can be triggered by writing the PSK into the new
>> controller sysfs attribute 'dhchap_secret' or 'dhchap_ctrl_secret'.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare at suse.de>
>> ---
>> drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig | 11 +
>> drivers/nvme/host/Makefile | 1 +
>> drivers/nvme/host/auth.c | 1164 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> drivers/nvme/host/auth.h | 25 +
>> drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 133 +++-
>> drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c | 79 ++-
>> drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.h | 7 +
>> drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 36 ++
>> drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c | 1 +
>> drivers/nvme/host/trace.c | 32 +
>> 10 files changed, 1482 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
>> create mode 100644 drivers/nvme/host/auth.h
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
>> index dc0450ca23a3..49269c581ec4 100644
>> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Kconfig
>> @@ -83,3 +83,14 @@ config NVME_TCP
>> from https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli.
>> If unsure, say N.
>> +
>> +config NVME_AUTH
>> + bool "NVM Express over Fabrics In-Band Authentication"
>> + depends on NVME_CORE
>> + select CRYPTO_HMAC
>> + select CRYPTO_SHA256
>> + select CRYPTO_SHA512
>> + help
>> + This provides support for NVMe over Fabrics In-Band
>> Authentication.
>> +
>> + If unsure, say N.
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile b/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile
>> index dfaacd472e5d..4bae2a4a8d8c 100644
>> --- a/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/Makefile
>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ nvme-core-$(CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH) += multipath.o
>> nvme-core-$(CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED) += zns.o
>> nvme-core-$(CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS) += fault_inject.o
>> nvme-core-$(CONFIG_NVME_HWMON) += hwmon.o
>> +nvme-core-$(CONFIG_NVME_AUTH) += auth.o
>> nvme-y += pci.o
>> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..6ab95a178213
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,1164 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (c) 2020 Hannes Reinecke, SUSE Linux
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/crc32.h>
>> +#include <linux/base64.h>
>> +#include <asm/unaligned.h>
>> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
>> +#include <crypto/dh.h>
>> +#include <crypto/ffdhe.h>
>> +#include "nvme.h"
>> +#include "fabrics.h"
>> +#include "auth.h"
>> +
>> +static atomic_t nvme_dhchap_seqnum = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
>> +
>> +struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context {
>> + struct list_head entry;
>> + struct work_struct auth_work;
>> + struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl;
>> + struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;
>> + void *buf;
>> + size_t buf_size;
>> + int qid;
>> + int error;
>> + u32 s1;
>> + u32 s2;
>> + u16 transaction;
>> + u8 status;
>> + u8 hash_id;
>> + u8 hash_len;
>> + u8 dhgroup_id;
>> + u8 c1[64];
>> + u8 c2[64];
>> + u8 response[64];
>> + u8 *host_response;
>> +};
>> +
>> +static struct nvme_auth_dhgroup_map {
>> + int id;
>> + const char name[16];
>> + const char kpp[16];
>> + int privkey_size;
>> + int pubkey_size;
>> +} dhgroup_map[] = {
>> + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL,
>> + .name = "null", .kpp = "null",
>> + .privkey_size = 0, .pubkey_size = 0 },
>> + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048,
>> + .name = "ffdhe2048", .kpp = "dh",
>> + .privkey_size = 256, .pubkey_size = 256 },
>> + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072,
>> + .name = "ffdhe3072", .kpp = "dh",
>> + .privkey_size = 384, .pubkey_size = 384 },
>> + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096,
>> + .name = "ffdhe4096", .kpp = "dh",
>> + .privkey_size = 512, .pubkey_size = 512 },
>> + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144,
>> + .name = "ffdhe6144", .kpp = "dh",
>> + .privkey_size = 768, .pubkey_size = 768 },
>> + { .id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192,
>> + .name = "ffdhe8192", .kpp = "dh",
>> + .privkey_size = 1024, .pubkey_size = 1024 },
>> +};
>> +
>> +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(int dhgroup_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
>> + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
>> + return dhgroup_map[i].name;
>> + }
>> + return NULL;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_name);
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size(int dhgroup_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
>> + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
>> + return dhgroup_map[i].pubkey_size;
>> + }
>> + return -1;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_pubkey_size);
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size(int dhgroup_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
>> + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
>> + return dhgroup_map[i].privkey_size;
>> + }
>> + return -1;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_privkey_size);
>> +
>> +const char *nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(int dhgroup_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
>> + if (dhgroup_map[i].id == dhgroup_id)
>> + return dhgroup_map[i].kpp;
>> + }
>> + return NULL;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp);
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_dhgroup_id(const char *dhgroup_name)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dhgroup_map); i++) {
>> + if (!strncmp(dhgroup_map[i].name, dhgroup_name,
>> + strlen(dhgroup_map[i].name)))
>> + return dhgroup_map[i].id;
>> + }
>> + return -1;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_dhgroup_id);
>> +
>> +static struct nvme_dhchap_hash_map {
>> + int id;
>> + int len;
>> + const char hmac[15];
>> + const char digest[15];
>> +} hash_map[] = {
>> + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256, .len = 32,
>> + .hmac = "hmac(sha256)", .digest = "sha256" },
>> + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384, .len = 48,
>> + .hmac = "hmac(sha384)", .digest = "sha384" },
>> + {.id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512, .len = 64,
>> + .hmac = "hmac(sha512)", .digest = "sha512" },
>> +};
>> +
>> +const char *nvme_auth_hmac_name(int hmac_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
>> + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id)
>> + return hash_map[i].hmac;
>> + }
>> + return NULL;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_name);
>> +
>> +const char *nvme_auth_digest_name(int hmac_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
>> + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id)
>> + return hash_map[i].digest;
>> + }
>> + return NULL;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_digest_name);
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_hmac_id(const char *hmac_name)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
>> + if (!strncmp(hash_map[i].hmac, hmac_name,
>> + strlen(hash_map[i].hmac)))
>> + return hash_map[i].id;
>> + }
>> + return -1;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_id);
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(int hmac_id)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hash_map); i++) {
>> + if (hash_map[i].id == hmac_id)
>> + return hash_map[i].len;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len);
>> +
>> +unsigned char *nvme_auth_extract_secret(unsigned char *secret, u8
>> key_hash,
>> + size_t *out_len)
>> +{
>> + unsigned char *key, *p;
>> + u32 crc;
>> + int key_len;
>> + size_t allocated_len = strlen(secret);
>> +
>> + /* Secret might be affixed with a ':' */
>> + p = strrchr(secret, ':');
>> + if (p)
>> + allocated_len = p - secret;
>> + key = kzalloc(allocated_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!key)
>> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>> +
>> + key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key);
>> + if (key_len < 0) {
>> + pr_debug("base64 key decoding error %d\n",
>> + key_len);
>> + return ERR_PTR(key_len);
>> + }
>> + if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 &&
>> + key_len != 68) {
>> + pr_debug("Invalid key len %d\n",
>> + key_len);
>
> pr_err?
>
Yeah; I've been running with debug enabled, so I would've seen it anyway.
>> + kfree_sensitive(key);
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> + }
>> + if (key_hash > 0 &&
>> + (key_len - 4) != nvme_auth_hmac_hash_len(key_hash)) {
>> + pr_debug("Invalid key len %d for %s\n", key_len,
>> + nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash));
>
> pr_err?
>
Same; will be fixing it.
>> + kfree_sensitive(key);
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* The last four bytes is the CRC in little-endian format */
>> + key_len -= 4;
>> + /*
>> + * The linux implementation doesn't do pre- and post-increments,
>> + * so we have to do it manually.
>> + */
>> + crc = ~crc32(~0, key, key_len);
>> +
>> + if (get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len) != crc) {
>> + pr_debug("DH-HMAC-CHAP key crc mismatch (key %08x, crc %08x)\n",
>> + get_unaligned_le32(key + key_len), crc);
>
> pr_err?
>
>> + kfree_sensitive(key);
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
>> + }
>> + *out_len = key_len;
>> + return key;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_extract_secret);
>> +
>> +u8 *nvme_auth_transform_key(u8 *key, size_t key_len, u8 key_hash,
>> char *nqn)
>> +{
>> + const char *hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key_hash);
>> + struct crypto_shash *key_tfm;
>> + struct shash_desc *shash;
>> + u8 *transformed_key;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + if (key_hash == 0) {
>> + transformed_key = kmemdup(key, key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + return transformed_key ? transformed_key : ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (!key || !key_len) {
>> + pr_warn("No key specified\n");
>
> pr_err?
>
>> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
>> + }
>> + if (!hmac_name) {
>> + pr_warn("Invalid key hash id %d\n", key_hash);
>
> pr_err?
>
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> + }
>> +
>> + key_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
>> + if (IS_ERR(key_tfm))
>> + return (u8 *)key_tfm;
>> +
>> + shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
>> + crypto_shash_descsize(key_tfm),
>> + GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!shash) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out_free_key;
>> + }
>> +
>> + transformed_key = kzalloc(crypto_shash_digestsize(key_tfm),
>> GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!transformed_key) {
>> + ret = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out_free_shash;
>> + }
>> +
>> + shash->tfm = key_tfm;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(key_tfm, key, key_len);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + goto out_free_shash;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + goto out_free_shash;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, nqn, strlen(nqn));
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + goto out_free_shash;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> + goto out_free_shash;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, transformed_key);
>> +out_free_shash:
>> + kfree(shash);
>> +out_free_key:
>> + crypto_free_shash(key_tfm);
>> + if (ret < 0) {
>> + kfree_sensitive(transformed_key);
>> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
>> + }
>> + return transformed_key;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key);
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_send(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid,
>> + void *data, size_t tl)
>> +{
>> + struct nvme_command cmd = {};
>> + blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
>> + 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED;
>> + struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
>> + ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + cmd.auth_send.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command;
>> + cmd.auth_send.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_send;
>> + cmd.auth_send.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER;
>> + cmd.auth_send.spsp0 = 0x01;
>> + cmd.auth_send.spsp1 = 0x01;
>> + cmd.auth_send.tl = cpu_to_le32(tl);
>> +
>> + ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, data, tl, 0, qid,
>> + 0, flags);
>> + if (ret > 0)
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
>> + "%s: qid %d nvme status %d\n", __func__, qid, ret);
>
> dev_err? Also can we phrase "failed auth_send" instead of the __func__?
>
Yeah; the logging messages are inconsistent as it is.
I've tried to stick the __func__ argument to any debug messages, and
some human readable string for 'normal' errors.
Possibly not that consistent, though.
>> + else if (ret < 0)
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
>> + "%s: qid %d error %d\n", __func__, qid, ret);
>
> dev_err?
>
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_receive(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid,
>> + void *buf, size_t al)
>> +{
>> + struct nvme_command cmd = {};
>> + blk_mq_req_flags_t flags = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
>> + 0 : BLK_MQ_REQ_NOWAIT | BLK_MQ_REQ_RESERVED;
>> + struct request_queue *q = qid == NVME_QID_ANY ?
>> + ctrl->fabrics_q : ctrl->connect_q;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + cmd.auth_receive.opcode = nvme_fabrics_command;
>> + cmd.auth_receive.fctype = nvme_fabrics_type_auth_receive;
>> + cmd.auth_receive.secp = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_PROTOCOL_IDENTIFIER;
>> + cmd.auth_receive.spsp0 = 0x01;
>> + cmd.auth_receive.spsp1 = 0x01;
>> + cmd.auth_receive.al = cpu_to_le32(al);
>> +
>> + ret = __nvme_submit_sync_cmd(q, &cmd, NULL, buf, al, 0, qid,
>> + 0, flags);
>> + if (ret > 0) {
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d nvme status %x\n",
>> + __func__, qid, ret);
>
> dev_err? "failed auth_recv" instead of the __func__
>
>> + ret = -EIO;
>> + }
>> + if (ret < 0) {
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d error %d\n",
>> + __func__, qid, ret);
>
> dev_err
>
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_receive_validate(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl, int qid,
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data,
>> + u16 transaction, u8 expected_msg)
>> +{
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d auth_type %d auth_id %x\n",
>> + __func__, qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id);
>> +
>> + if (data->auth_type == NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES &&
>> + data->auth_id == NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE1) {
>> + return data->rescode_exp;
>> + }
>> + if (data->auth_type != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES ||
>> + data->auth_id != expected_msg) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d invalid message %02x/%02x\n",
>> + qid, data->auth_type, data->auth_id);
>> + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE;
>> + }
>> + if (le16_to_cpu(data->t_id) != transaction) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d invalid transaction ID %d\n",
>> + qid, le16_to_cpu(data->t_id));
>
> why not dev_err?
>
Because it's a protocol error, and we can invoke the protocol error
handling here.
Any dev_err() messages are inhibiting us to run the protocol at all.
Or, at least, that's how I tried to handle things.
>> + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_MESSAGE;
>> + }
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_negotiate_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_negotiate_data *data = chap->buf;
>> + size_t size = sizeof(*data) + sizeof(union nvmf_auth_protocol);
>> +
>> + if (chap->buf_size < size) {
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>> + memset((u8 *)chap->buf, 0, size);
>> + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_COMMON_MESSAGES;
>> + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_NEGOTIATE;
>> + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
>> + data->sc_c = 0; /* No secure channel concatenation */
>> + data->napd = 1;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.authid = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_AUTH_ID;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.halen = 3;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.dhlen = 6;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[0] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA256;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[1] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA384;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[2] = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_SHA512;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[3] =
>> NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[4] =
>> NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_2048;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[5] =
>> NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_3072;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[6] =
>> NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_4096;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[7] =
>> NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_6144;
>> + data->auth_protocol[0].dhchap.idlist[8] =
>> NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_8192;
>> +
>> + return size;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_challenge(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_challenge_data *data = chap->buf;
>> + u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen);
>> + size_t size = sizeof(*data) + data->hl + dhvlen;
>> + const char *hmac_name, *kpp_name;
>> +
>> + if (chap->buf_size < size) {
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
>> + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
>> + }
>> +
>> + hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(data->hashid);
>> + if (!hmac_name) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: invalid HASH ID %d\n",
>> + chap->qid, data->hashid);
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
>> + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (chap->hash_id == data->hashid && chap->shash_tfm &&
>> + !strcmp(crypto_shash_alg_name(chap->shash_tfm), hmac_name) &&
>> + crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) == data->hl) {
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: reuse existing hash %s\n",
>> + chap->qid, hmac_name);
>> + goto select_kpp;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Reset if hash cannot be reused */
>> + if (chap->shash_tfm) {
>> + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm);
>> + chap->hash_id = 0;
>> + chap->hash_len = 0;
>> + }
>> + chap->shash_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0,
>> + CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY);
>> + if (IS_ERR(chap->shash_tfm)) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: failed to allocate hash %s, error %ld\n",
>> + chap->qid, hmac_name, PTR_ERR(chap->shash_tfm));
>> + chap->shash_tfm = NULL;
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED;
>> + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (crypto_shash_digestsize(chap->shash_tfm) != data->hl) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n",
>> + chap->qid, data->hl);
>> + crypto_free_shash(chap->shash_tfm);
>> + chap->shash_tfm = NULL;
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
>> + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Reset host response if the hash had been changed */
>> + if (chap->hash_id != data->hashid) {
>> + kfree(chap->host_response);
>> + chap->host_response = NULL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + chap->hash_id = data->hashid;
>> + chap->hash_len = data->hl;
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "qid %d: selected hash %s\n",
>> + chap->qid, hmac_name);
>> +
>> +select_kpp:
>> + kpp_name = nvme_auth_dhgroup_kpp(data->dhgid);
>> + if (!kpp_name) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: invalid DH group id %d\n",
>> + chap->qid, data->dhgid);
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
>> + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (data->dhgid != NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_DHGROUP_NULL) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: unsupported DH group %s\n",
>> + chap->qid, kpp_name);
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_DHGROUP_UNUSABLE;
>> + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
>> + } else if (dhvlen != 0) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: invalid DH value for NULL DH\n",
>> + chap->qid);
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
>> + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
>> + }
>> + chap->dhgroup_id = data->dhgid;
>> +
>> + chap->s1 = le32_to_cpu(data->seqnum);
>> + memcpy(chap->c1, data->cval, chap->hash_len);
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_reply_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = chap->buf;
>> + size_t size = sizeof(*data);
>> +
>> + size += 2 * chap->hash_len;
>> +
>> + if (chap->buf_size < size) {
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
>> +
>> + memset(chap->buf, 0, size);
>> + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES;
>> + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY;
>> + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
>> + data->hl = chap->hash_len;
>> + data->dhvlen = 0;
>> + memcpy(data->rval, chap->response, chap->hash_len);
>> + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret) {
>> + get_random_bytes(chap->c2, chap->hash_len);
>> + data->cvalid = 1;
>> + chap->s2 = atomic_inc_return(&nvme_dhchap_seqnum);
>> + memcpy(data->rval + chap->hash_len, chap->c2,
>> + chap->hash_len);
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl challenge %*ph\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid,
>> + chap->hash_len, chap->c2);
>> + } else {
>> + memset(chap->c2, 0, chap->hash_len);
>> + chap->s2 = 0;
>> + }
>> + data->seqnum = cpu_to_le32(chap->s2);
>> + return size;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_process_dhchap_success1(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success1_data *data = chap->buf;
>> + size_t size = sizeof(*data);
>> +
>> + if (ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret)
>> + size += chap->hash_len;
>> +
>> + if (chap->buf_size < size) {
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD;
>> + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (data->hl != chap->hash_len) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: invalid hash length %d\n",
>> + chap->qid, data->hl);
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_HASH_UNUSABLE;
>> + return NVME_SC_INVALID_FIELD;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Just print out information for the admin queue */
>> + if (chap->qid == -1)
>> + dev_info(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid 0: authenticated with hash %s dhgroup %s\n",
>> + nvme_auth_hmac_name(chap->hash_id),
>> + nvme_auth_dhgroup_name(chap->dhgroup_id));
>> +
>> + if (!data->rvalid)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /* Validate controller response */
>> + if (memcmp(chap->response, data->rval, data->hl)) {
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d ctrl response %*ph\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, data->rval);
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response %*ph\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, chap->response);
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid %d: controller authentication failed\n",
>> + chap->qid);
>> + chap->status = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_FAILED;
>> + return NVME_SC_AUTH_REQUIRED;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Just print out information for the admin queue */
>> + if (chap->qid == -1)
>> + dev_info(ctrl->device,
>> + "qid 0: controller authenticated\n");
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_success2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_success2_data *data = chap->buf;
>> + size_t size = sizeof(*data);
>> +
>> + memset(chap->buf, 0, size);
>> + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES;
>> + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS2;
>> + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
>> +
>> + return size;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_set_dhchap_failure2_data(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_failure_data *data = chap->buf;
>> + size_t size = sizeof(*data);
>> +
>> + memset(chap->buf, 0, size);
>> + data->auth_type = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGES;
>> + data->auth_id = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_FAILURE2;
>> + data->t_id = cpu_to_le16(chap->transaction);
>> + data->rescode = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_REASON_FAILED;
>> + data->rescode_exp = chap->status;
>> +
>> + return size;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_dhchap_host_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm);
>> + u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c1;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d
>> transaction %d\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, chap->s1, chap->transaction);
>> +
>> + if (!chap->host_response) {
>> + chap->host_response = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->dhchap_key,
>> + ctrl->dhchap_key_len,
>> + ctrl->dhchap_key_hash,
>> + ctrl->opts->host->nqn);
>> + if (IS_ERR(chap->host_response)) {
>> + ret = PTR_ERR(chap->host_response);
>> + chap->host_response = NULL;
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> + } else {
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d re-using host response\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid);
>> + }
>> +
>> + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(chap->shash_tfm,
>> + chap->host_response, ctrl->dhchap_key_len);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: failed to set key, error %d\n",
>> + chap->qid, ret);
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + put_unaligned_le32(chap->s1, buf);
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf);
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "HostHost", 8);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
>> + strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn));
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn,
>> + strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn));
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response);
>> +out:
>> + if (challenge != chap->c1)
>> + kfree(challenge);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int nvme_auth_dhchap_ctrl_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
>> + struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
>> +{
>> + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm);
>> + u8 *ctrl_response;
>> + u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c2;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + ctrl_response = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key,
>> + ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key_len,
>> + ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash,
>> + ctrl->opts->subsysnqn);
>> + if (IS_ERR(ctrl_response)) {
>> + ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl_response);
>> + return ret;
>> + }
>> + ret = crypto_shash_setkey(chap->shash_tfm,
>> + ctrl_response, ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key_len);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: failed to set key, error %d\n",
>> + chap->qid, ret);
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %d
>> transaction %d\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, chap->s2, chap->transaction);
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d challenge %*ph\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, chap->hash_len, challenge);
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d subsysnqn %s\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn);
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d hostnqn %s\n",
>> + __func__, chap->qid, ctrl->opts->host->nqn);
>> + shash->tfm = chap->shash_tfm;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, challenge, chap->hash_len);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + put_unaligned_le32(chap->s2, buf);
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 4);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + put_unaligned_le16(chap->transaction, buf);
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 2);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + memset(buf, 0, 4);
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "Controller", 10);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->subsysnqn,
>> + strlen(ctrl->opts->subsysnqn));
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, buf, 1);
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
>> + strlen(ctrl->opts->host->nqn));
>> + if (ret)
>> + goto out;
>> + ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, chap->response);
>> +out:
>> + if (challenge != chap->c2)
>> + kfree(challenge);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_generate_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
>> +{
>> + u8 *secret = ctrl->opts->dhchap_secret;
>> + u8 *key;
>> + size_t key_len;
>> + u8 key_hash;
>> +
>> + if (!secret)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + if (sscanf(secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:", &key_hash) != 1)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */
>> + key = nvme_auth_extract_secret(secret + 10, key_hash,
>> + &key_len);
>> + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>> + dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "failed to extract key, error %ld\n",
>> + PTR_ERR(key));
>> + return PTR_ERR(key);
>> + }
>> +
>> + ctrl->dhchap_key = key;
>> + key = NULL;
>> + ctrl->dhchap_key_len = key_len;
>> + ctrl->dhchap_key_hash = key_hash;
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_key);
>> +
>> +int nvme_auth_generate_ctrl_key(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl)
>> +{
>> + u8 *secret = ctrl->opts->dhchap_ctrl_secret;
>> + u8 *key;
>> + size_t key_len;
>> + u8 key_hash;
>> +
>> + if (!secret)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + if (sscanf(secret, "DHHC-1:%hhd:%*s:", &key_hash) != 1)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /* Pass in the secret without the 'DHHC-1:XX:' prefix */
>> + key = nvme_auth_extract_secret(secret + 10, key_hash,
>> + &key_len);
>> + if (IS_ERR(key))
>> + return PTR_ERR(key);
>> +
>> + ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key = key;
>> + key = NULL;
>> + ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key_len = key_len;
>> + ctrl->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash = key_hash;
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_ctrl_key);
>
> This and the other look identical just operate on
> a different key, perhaps merge them into one?
>
Yeah; was too lazy here.
I could easily add a flag to differentiate between host and controller key.
> Overall this looks sane to me.
> Just nitpicking on the logging to use err when you
> hit a errors.
Will be fixing stuff up and send out a new version.
Cheers,
Hannes
--
Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect
hare at suse.de +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, Maxfeldstr. 5, 90409 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: Felix Imendörffer
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