[PATCH v18] arm64: mm: Handle Granule Protection Faults (GPFs)
Suzuki K Poulose
suzuki.poulose at arm.com
Tue Sep 29 03:47:01 PDT 2026
On 29/09/2026 11:40, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 28, 2026 at 12:01:18PM +0100, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
>> On 22/09/2026 15:49, Catalin Marinas wrote:
>>> On Tue, Sep 22, 2026 at 02:21:13PM +0100, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
>>>> I had another look and we could handle this via kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort()
>>>> see in arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>>> index 87e49251e0447..af5a4bf961aae 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>>> @@ -1731,6 +1731,9 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc
>>>> *s2fd)
>>>> gfn_t gfn;
>>>> int ret;
>>>>
>>>> + if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>
>>> I wonder whether we should add a KVM_BUG_ON() here. With the rest of the
>>> changes, we should never get in this situation. Well, to be revisited
>>> for private devices.
>>>
>>> Also maybe move it to the caller, kvm_vm_mem_abort(), and not change
>>> kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(). Something like:
>>>
>>> if (private_ipa_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa) &&
>>> KVM_BUG_ON(!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot), kvm))
>>> return -EIO;
>>>
>>> To me it makes more sense for gmem_abort() to be called only *if* it's a
>>> gmem slot. So any inconsistency, avoiding user_mem_abort() for private
>>> memory, should be done in the caller. I assume the caller will also have
>>> to route the private device path as well rather than rely on
>>> gmem_abort().
>>>
>>>> +
>>>> if (!perm_fault) {
>>>> memcache = get_mmu_memcache(vcpu);
>>>> ret = topup_mmu_memcache(vcpu, memcache);
>>>> @@ -2277,10 +2280,12 @@ static bool private_ipa_fault(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>> phys_addr_t fault_ipa);
>>>> static bool kvm_fault_is_gmem_abort(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>> const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
>>>> {
>>>> - if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(s2fd->memslot))
>>>> - return false;
>>>> if (kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(s2fd->memslot))
>>>> return true;
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * For Realms, all private faults must be backed by GMEM.
>>>> + * TODO: Handle Trusted device private memory mappings.
>>>> + */
>>>> if (private_ipa_fault(kvm, s2fd->fault_ipa))
>>>> return true;
>>>> return false;
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Also, I have the following hunk for preventing memslot modifications.
>>>> I will add this to v20 integration branch, which is almost ready ;-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>>> index 582b48e34486b..87e49251e0447 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
>>>> @@ -2783,6 +2783,18 @@ void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>> }
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +static bool kvm_prevents_memslot_change(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_mr_change change)
>>>> +{
>>>> + /* Cannot modify memslots once a pVM has run or Realm created */
>>>> + if (change != KVM_MR_DELETE && change != KVM_MR_MOVE)
>>>> + return false;
>>>> +
>>>> + if ((kvm_vm_is_protected_pkvm(kvm) && pkvm_hyp_vm_is_created(kvm)) ||
>>>> + kvm_realm_is_created(kvm))
>>>> + return true;
>>>> + return false;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>
>> This needs to be tweaked for Realm to support non-secure device assignment.
>> Aneesh reports that the Device assignment fails now,
>> because the Device BAR reset deletes the memory slot and re-registers
>> it, which the above change prevents.
>>
>> I will modify that to
>> 1. Prevent "Guest-memfd" backed memory slot deletion. Makes sure that
>> nothing can replace a private memory slot.
>> 2. Allow non-Guest-memfd backed memory slots to be created
>> after the Realm is created. We anyways prevent "private" memory
>> to be mapped from a non-Guest-memfd memslot.
>
> Yes, I think this should be fine. But at least with the last version I
> looked at, we did not prevent private memory from being mapped from
> non-guest_memfd slots (there was a way to delete the gmem slot, add a
> normal one while the guest does a private IPA access). If we prevent
> gmem slot deletion, we no longer have this issue, although we should
> warn somewhere on the user_mem_abort() both.
>
> Anyway, to be discussed on the KVM patches, not here. I raised it
> initially here as I was looking whether a non-gmem slot ever ends up
> private and trigger the GPF.
Agree. For the record here is what the change looks like, to be included
in v21 kvm-integration. We can discuss it with KVM changes.
KVM: arm64: CCA: Prevent memslot modifications after Realm creation
Once the Realm is created, prevent any changes to guest_memfd backed
memslots, as the private memory is provided by slots backed by gmem.
This is also validated when we handle a fault for Realm Stage2.
Additionally, similar to pKVM, we do not support dirty logging or
read-only memslots.
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose at arm.com>
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index 2e584a187602f..ea14f66ed9f29 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2726,17 +2726,28 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
hva_t hva, reg_end;
int ret = 0;
+ if (kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm)) {
+ if (new &&
+ new->flags & (KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES |
KVM_MEM_READONLY)) {
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
if (kvm_vm_is_protected_pkvm(kvm)) {
/* Cannot modify memslots once a pVM has run. */
if (pkvm_hyp_vm_is_created(kvm) &&
(change == KVM_MR_DELETE || change == KVM_MR_MOVE)) {
return -EPERM;
}
-
- if (new &&
- new->flags & (KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES |
KVM_MEM_READONLY)) {
+ } else if (kvm_realm_is_created(kvm)) {
+ /*
+ * Once the Realm is created, we cannot modify any slots
that
+ * could be providing private memory. i.e., guest_memfd
backed
+ * slots.
+ * TODO: Handle trusted device private memory slots
+ */
+ if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(old) || kvm_slot_has_gmem(new))
return -EPERM;
- }
}
if (change != KVM_MR_CREATE && change != KVM_MR_MOVE &&
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
index 8756ea4c76619..5755422ddcb49 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/rmi.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,7 @@ int kvm_activate_realm(struct kvm *kvm)
if (kvm_realm_state(kvm) >= REALM_STATE_ACTIVE)
return 0;
+ guard(mutex)(&kvm->slots_lock);
guard(mutex)(&kvm->arch.config_lock);
/* Check again with the lock held */
if (kvm_realm_state(kvm) >= REALM_STATE_ACTIVE)
>
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