[PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening

[Linu Cherian]

Kevin,

On Tue, Sep 08, 2026 at 09:56:32AM +0200, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> On 07/09/2026 14:19, Linu Cherian wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 03, 2026 at 06:47:50PM +0200, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> >>>> [...]
> >>>>
> >>>> kpkeys
> >>>> ======
> >>>>
> >>>> The use of pkeys involves two separate mechanisms: assigning a pkey to
> >>>> pages, and defining the pkeys -> permissions mapping via the pkey
> >>>> register. This is implemented through the following interface:
> >>>>
> >>>> - Pages are assigned a pkey in the linear map using set_memory_pkey().
> >>>>   This is sufficient for this series, but it is also plausible for
> >>>>   higher-level allocators to support marking allocations with a given
> >>>>   pkey.
> >>>>
> >>>> - The pkey register is configured based on a *kpkeys context*. kpkeys
> >>>>   contexts are represented as simple integers that correspond to a given
> >>>>   configuration, for instance:
> >>>>
> >>>>   KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT:
> >>>>         RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT
> >>>>         RO access to any other KPKEYS_PKEY_*
> >>>>
> >>>>   KPKEYS_CTX_<FEAT>:
> >>>>         RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT
> >>>>         RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_<FEAT>
> >>>>         RO access to any other KPKEYS_PKEY_*
> >>>>
> >>>>   Only pkeys that are managed by the kpkeys framework are impacted;
> >>>>   permissions for other pkeys are left unchanged (this allows for other
> >>>>   schemes using pkeys to be used in parallel, and arch-specific use of
> >>>>   certain pkeys).
> >>> - Adding some basic details on what a scheme and context is quite helpful.
> >>>
> >>>  - Giving some hints (may be an example) on how multiple schemes and multiple contexts
> >>>   play together would be quite helpful.
> >> "scheme" doesn't mean anything precise, it's only the notion that pkeys
> >> that aren't reserved for kpkeys (i.e. anything but 0 or 1 in this
> >> series) may be used for other purposes. Happy to reword if you have a
> >> suggestion.
> > Got it. IMHO, adding two definitions towards the start would make it easier to follow.
> >
> > kpkeys: Set of pkeys reserved and managed by the kpkeys framework.
> >         Pkeys outside this set are left untouched.
> >
> > kpkeys context: A permission state that defines the permissions for each pkey owned by
> >  	kpkeys
> >
> > Or something better.
> 
> Got it, will add something along those lines, thanks!
> 
> >>> [...]
> >>>> Open questions
> >>>> ==============
> >>>>
> >>>> A few aspects in this RFC that are debatable and/or worth discussing:
> >>>>
> >>>> - There is currently no restriction on how kpkeys contexts map to pkeys
> >>>>   permissions. A typical approach is to allocate one pkey per context and
> >>>>   make it writable in that context only. As the number of contexts
> >>> Probably to avoid the assumption, may be we can we have something like
> >>> below 
> >>>
> >>> For a pkey P, we could define
> >>> PKEY_P_PERM_CTXT_OTHERS	 //permission for pkey p in other contexts
> >>> PKEY_P_PERM_CTXT_SELF	 //permission for pkey p in self context
> >>>
> >>> With the assumption of one pkey mapped for every context,
> >>> the permission for the default context would look something like,
> >>>
> >>> PKEY_DEF_PERM_CTXT_SELF << PKEY_DEF_PKEY_SHIFT |
> >>> PKEY_CT0_PERM_CTXT_OTHERS << PKEY_CT0_PKEY_SHIFT | 
> >>> PKEY_CT1_PERM_CTXT_OTHERS << PKEY_CT1_PKEY_SHIFT |
> >>> ...(for all valid contexts)
> >>>
> >>> where,
> >>> Permission key, PKEY_DEF is associated with context DEFAULT,
> >>> Permission key, PKEY_CT0 is associated with context CT0,
> >>> Permission key, PKEY_CT1 is associated with context CT1
> >> This adds assumptions rather than avoiding them. *Typically* when adding
> >> a context you'd allocate a pkey that's only writable by this context,
> >> but it doesn't have to be this way.
> > Okay agree. Then may be something like
> >
> > Define permissions:
> >
> > For default context,
> > KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT_PERM_PKEY_DEF
> > KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT_PERM_PKEY_CT0
> >
> > For CT0 context,
> > KPKEYS_CTX_CT0_PERM_PKEY_DEF
> > KPKEYS_CTX_CT0_PERM_PKEY_CT0
> >
> > Define POR_EL1:
> >
> > For default context,
> > KPKEYS_POR_EL1_DEFAULT
> >
> > For CT0 context,
> > KPKEYS_POR_EL1_CT0
> >
> > Finally,
> > #define POR_EL1_INIT KPKEYS_POR_EL1_DEFAULT
> 
> We cannot do this because POR_EL1 is arm64-specific and its format is
> not at all the same as x86's PKRS for instance.
> 
> I think what you're getting at is that the permissions for each pkeys in
> a given context could be defined at the generic level. This could be
> done, but I'm not sure this is essential, and we may not need all archs
> to use exactly the same permissions. There's also the issue that x86
> only encodes RW permissions directly, not X.

Really didnt mean to keep these macros generic. Sorry for the confusion. I could
have replied this on a arm64 specific patch.

The original intention was to suggest the use of macros similar to above in the arm64
world.


> 
> > Probably using something similar would make the idea of kpkeys context 
> > more evident in the code as well ?
> >
> >> The configuration space is more easily understood by considering the
> >> other use-cases we've investigated (struct cred protection and eBPF
> >> isolation, linked further down). For instance, for cred protection, we
> >> had KPKEYS_LVL_UNRESTRICTED with write access to all pkeys, and for eBPF
> >> isolation, we need a level that is less privileged and therefore does
> >> *not* have write access to pkey 0.
> >>
> >>>>   increases, we may however run out of pkeys, especially on arm64 (just
> >>>>   8 pkeys with POE). Depending on the use-cases, it may be acceptable to
> >>>>   use the same pkey for the data associated to multiple contexts.
> >>> Lets say two contexts A and B, use the same pkey P as their permission matches.
> >>> But then, when we enter context A, permission for pkey P gets
> >>> relaxed, then that would relax permission for pages associated with
> >>> context B as well which is unintended ?
> >> That may be exactly what is intended, it all depends on the use-case. C1
> >> may have a private pkey P1, and C2 P2, and then P3 that is shared by C1
> >> and C2 (writable by both)
> > Got it. With each context defining permissions for each pkey owned by
> > kpkeys makes sense. 
> >
> > Also do we need to assume that nesting of different contexts is not valid ?
> > For example,
> > Default context:
> > 	enter CTX 0
> > 		enter CTX 1
> > 		leave CTX 1
> > 	leave CTX 0
> > Default context:
> 
> That is a good question. The enter/leave logic does support nesting,
> since leave() restores the pkeys register as it was on enter(), but
> whether the inner context has sufficient permissions will depend on the
> situation. Certainly if nesting is expected then it has to be taken into
> account when defining the permissions for each context.
> 

Exactly. Also if nesting need to be disallowed for certain contexts,
then it needs to be taken care as well ?  Feels like would be worth
covering the aspect of nesting in documentation and cover letter.

Thanks,
Linu Cherian.