[PATCH v3 09/14] arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms
Catalin Marinas
catalin.marinas at arm.com
Fri Jun 21 02:05:39 PDT 2024
On Wed, Jun 05, 2024 at 10:30:01AM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
> +static int __set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr,
> + int numpages,
> + bool encrypt)
> +{
> + unsigned long set_prot = 0, clear_prot = 0;
> + phys_addr_t start, end;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!is_realm_world())
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (!__is_lm_address(addr))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + start = __virt_to_phys(addr);
> + end = start + numpages * PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> + /*
> + * Break the mapping before we make any changes to avoid stale TLB
> + * entries or Synchronous External Aborts caused by RIPAS_EMPTY
> + */
> + ret = __change_memory_common(addr, PAGE_SIZE * numpages,
> + __pgprot(0),
> + __pgprot(PTE_VALID));
> +
> + if (encrypt) {
> + clear_prot = PROT_NS_SHARED;
> + ret = rsi_set_memory_range_protected(start, end);
> + } else {
> + set_prot = PROT_NS_SHARED;
> + ret = rsi_set_memory_range_shared(start, end);
> + }
While reading Michael's replies, it occurred to me that we need check
the error paths. Here for example we ignore the return code from
__change_memory_common() by overriding the 'ret' variable.
I think the only other place where we don't check at all is the ITS
allocation/freeing. Freeing is more interesting as I think we should not
release the page back to the kernel if we did not manage to restore the
original state. Better have a memory leak than data leak.
--
Catalin
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