[PATCH v2 14/26] KVM: arm64: nv: Add trap forwarding infrastructure
Oliver Upton
oliver.upton at linux.dev
Fri Jul 28 11:33:31 PDT 2023
On Fri, Jul 28, 2023 at 09:29:40AM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
[...]
> +/*
> + * Bit assignment for the trap controls. We use a 64bit word with the
> + * following layout for each trapped sysreg:
> + *
> + * [9:0] enum trap_group (10 bits)
> + * [13:10] enum fgt_group_id (4 bits)
> + * [19:14] bit number in the FGT register (6 bits)
> + * [20] trap polarity (1 bit)
> + * [62:21] Unused (42 bits)
> + * [63] RES0 - Must be zero, as lost on insertion in the xarray
> + */
> +union trap_config {
> + u64 val;
> + struct {
> + unsigned long cgt:10; /* Coarse trap id */
> + unsigned long fgt:4; /* Fing Grained Trap id */
> + unsigned long bit:6; /* Bit number */
> + unsigned long pol:1; /* Polarity */
> + unsigned long unk:42; /* Unknown */
> + unsigned long mbz:1; /* Must Be Zero */
> + };
> +};
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think the compiler is going to
whine if any of these bitfields are initialized with a larger value than
can be represented... Do you think some BUILD_BUG_ON() is in order to
ensure that trap_group fits in ::cgt?
BUILD_BUG_ON(__NR_TRAP_IDS__ >= BIT(10));
> +struct encoding_to_trap_config {
> + const u32 encoding;
> + const u32 end;
> + const union trap_config tc;
> +};
> +
> +#define SR_RANGE_TRAP(sr_start, sr_end, trap_id) \
> + { \
> + .encoding = sr_start, \
> + .end = sr_end, \
> + .tc = { \
> + .cgt = trap_id, \
> + }, \
> + }
> +
> +#define SR_TRAP(sr, trap_id) SR_RANGE_TRAP(sr, sr, trap_id)
> +
> +/*
> + * Map encoding to trap bits for exception reported with EC=0x18.
> + * These must only be evaluated when running a nested hypervisor, but
> + * that the current context is not a hypervisor context. When the
> + * trapped access matches one of the trap controls, the exception is
> + * re-injected in the nested hypervisor.
> + */
> +static const struct encoding_to_trap_config encoding_to_cgt[] __initconst = {
> +};
> +
> +static DEFINE_XARRAY(sr_forward_xa);
> +
> +static union trap_config get_trap_config(u32 sysreg)
> +{
> + return (union trap_config) {
> + .val = xa_to_value(xa_load(&sr_forward_xa, sysreg)),
> + };
Should we be checking for NULL here? AFAICT, the use of sentinel values
in the trap_group enum would effectively guarantee each trap_config has
a nonzero value.
> +}
> +
> +void __init populate_nv_trap_config(void)
> +{
> + for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(encoding_to_cgt); i++) {
> + const struct encoding_to_trap_config *cgt = &encoding_to_cgt[i];
> + void *prev;
> +
> + prev = xa_store_range(&sr_forward_xa, cgt->encoding, cgt->end,
> + xa_mk_value(cgt->tc.val), GFP_KERNEL);
> + WARN_ON(prev);
Returning the error here and failing the overall KVM initialization
seems to be the safest option. The WARN is still handy, though.
> + }
> +
> + kvm_info("nv: %ld coarse grained trap handlers\n",
> + ARRAY_SIZE(encoding_to_cgt));
> +
> +}
> +
> +static enum trap_behaviour get_behaviour(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + const struct trap_bits *tb)
> +{
> + enum trap_behaviour b = BEHAVE_HANDLE_LOCALLY;
> + u64 val;
> +
> + val = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, tb->index);
> + if ((val & tb->mask) == tb->value)
> + b |= tb->behaviour;
> +
> + return b;
> +}
> +
> +static enum trap_behaviour __do_compute_trap_behaviour(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> + const enum trap_group id,
> + enum trap_behaviour b)
> +{
> + switch (id) {
> + const enum trap_group *cgids;
> +
> + case __RESERVED__ ... __MULTIPLE_CONTROL_BITS__ - 1:
> + if (likely(id != __RESERVED__))
> + b |= get_behaviour(vcpu, &coarse_trap_bits[id]);
> + break;
> + case __MULTIPLE_CONTROL_BITS__ ... __COMPLEX_CONDITIONS__ - 1:
> + /* Yes, this is recursive. Don't do anything stupid. */
> + cgids = coarse_control_combo[id - __MULTIPLE_CONTROL_BITS__];
> + for (int i = 0; cgids[i] != __RESERVED__; i++)
> + b |= __do_compute_trap_behaviour(vcpu, cgids[i], b);
Would it make sense to WARN here if one of the child trap ids was in the
recursive range?
--
Thanks,
Oliver
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