[PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen

[Juergen Gross]

On 25.04.22 09:58, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 25, 2022 at 09:47:49AM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>> Would the Xen specific bits fit into Confidential Computing Platform
>>> checks? I will let Juergen/Boris comment on this.
>>
>> I don't think cc_platform_has would be correct here. Xen certainly
>> provides more isolation between guests and dom0, but "Confidential
>> Computing" is basically orthogonal to that feature.
> 
> The point of cc_platform_has is to remove all these open code checks.
> If a Xen hypervisor / dom0 can't access arbitrary guest memory for
> virtual I/O and we need special APIs for that it certainly false
> into the scope of cc_platform_has, even if the confientiality is
> rather limited.

In case the x86 maintainers are fine with that I won't oppose.


Juergen
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