[PATCH 3/5] kasan, mm: integrate page_alloc init with HW_TAGS
Marco Elver
elver at google.com
Mon Mar 8 11:35:42 GMT 2021
On Sat, Mar 06, 2021 at 01:15AM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> This change uses the previously added memory initialization feature
> of HW_TAGS KASAN routines for page_alloc memory when init_on_alloc/free
> is enabled.
>
> With this change, kernel_init_free_pages() is no longer called when
> both HW_TAGS KASAN and init_on_alloc/free are enabled. Instead, memory
> is initialized in KASAN runtime.
>
> To avoid discrepancies with which memory gets initialized that can be
> caused by future changes, both KASAN and kernel_init_free_pages() hooks
> are put together and a warning comment is added.
>
> This patch changes the order in which memory initialization and page
> poisoning hooks are called. This doesn't lead to any side-effects, as
> whenever page poisoning is enabled, memory initialization gets disabled.
>
> Combining setting allocation tags with memory initialization improves
> HW_TAGS KASAN performance when init_on_alloc/free is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl at google.com>
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 16 ++++++++--------
> mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++++----
> mm/mempool.c | 4 ++--
> mm/page_alloc.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 1d89b8175027..4c0f414a893b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -120,20 +120,20 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *addr, size_t size)
> __kasan_unpoison_range(addr, size);
> }
>
> -void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
> +void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init);
> static __always_inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page,
> - unsigned int order)
> + unsigned int order, bool init)
> {
> if (kasan_enabled())
> - __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order);
> + __kasan_alloc_pages(page, order, init);
> }
>
> -void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order);
> +void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init);
> static __always_inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page,
> - unsigned int order)
> + unsigned int order, bool init)
> {
> if (kasan_enabled())
> - __kasan_free_pages(page, order);
> + __kasan_free_pages(page, order, init);
> }
>
> void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
> @@ -282,8 +282,8 @@ static inline slab_flags_t kasan_never_merge(void)
> return 0;
> }
> static inline void kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size) {}
> -static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
> -static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order) {}
> +static inline void kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init) {}
> +static inline void kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init) {}
> static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
> unsigned int *size,
> slab_flags_t *flags) {}
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 316f7f8cd8e6..6107c795611f 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ slab_flags_t __kasan_never_merge(void)
> return 0;
> }
>
> -void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> +void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
> {
> u8 tag;
> unsigned long i;
> @@ -108,14 +108,14 @@ void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> tag = kasan_random_tag();
> for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
> page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
> - kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, false);
> + kasan_unpoison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
> }
>
> -void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
> +void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
> {
> if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
> kasan_poison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order,
> - KASAN_FREE_PAGE, false);
> + KASAN_FREE_PAGE, init);
> }
>
> /*
> diff --git a/mm/mempool.c b/mm/mempool.c
> index 79959fac27d7..fe19d290a301 100644
> --- a/mm/mempool.c
> +++ b/mm/mempool.c
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static __always_inline void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
> if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc)
> kasan_slab_free_mempool(element);
> else if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)
> - kasan_free_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data);
> + kasan_free_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data, false);
> }
>
> static void kasan_unpoison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
> @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static void kasan_unpoison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
> if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab || pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc)
> kasan_unpoison_range(element, __ksize(element));
> else if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)
> - kasan_alloc_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data);
> + kasan_alloc_pages(element, (unsigned long)pool->pool_data, false);
> }
>
> static __always_inline void add_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
> diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
> index 0efb07b5907c..175bdb36d113 100644
> --- a/mm/page_alloc.c
> +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
> @@ -396,14 +396,14 @@ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(deferred_pages);
> * initialization is done, but this is not likely to happen.
> */
> static inline void kasan_free_nondeferred_pages(struct page *page, int order,
> - fpi_t fpi_flags)
> + bool init, fpi_t fpi_flags)
> {
> if (static_branch_unlikely(&deferred_pages))
> return;
> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
> (fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON))
> return;
> - kasan_free_pages(page, order);
> + kasan_free_pages(page, order, init);
> }
>
> /* Returns true if the struct page for the pfn is uninitialised */
> @@ -455,12 +455,12 @@ defer_init(int nid, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
> }
> #else
> static inline void kasan_free_nondeferred_pages(struct page *page, int order,
> - fpi_t fpi_flags)
> + bool init, fpi_t fpi_flags)
> {
> if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) &&
> (fpi_flags & FPI_SKIP_KASAN_POISON))
> return;
> - kasan_free_pages(page, order);
> + kasan_free_pages(page, order, init);
> }
>
> static inline bool early_page_uninitialised(unsigned long pfn)
> @@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
> unsigned int order, bool check_free, fpi_t fpi_flags)
> {
> int bad = 0;
> + bool init;
>
> VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTail(page), page);
>
> @@ -1299,16 +1300,21 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page,
> debug_check_no_obj_freed(page_address(page),
> PAGE_SIZE << order);
> }
> - if (want_init_on_free())
> - kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
>
> kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order);
>
> /*
> + * As memory initialization is integrated with hardware tag-based
> + * KASAN, kasan_free_pages and kernel_init_free_pages must be
> + * kept together to avoid discrepancies in behavior.
> + *
> * With hardware tag-based KASAN, memory tags must be set before the
> * page becomes unavailable via debug_pagealloc or arch_free_page.
> */
> - kasan_free_nondeferred_pages(page, order, fpi_flags);
> + init = want_init_on_free();
> + if (init && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS))
Doing the !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) check is awkward, and
assumes internal knowledge of the KASAN implementation and how all
current and future architectures that support HW_TAGS work.
Could we instead add a static inline helper to <linux/kasan.h>, e.g.
kasan_supports_init() or so?
That way, these checks won't grow uncontrollable if a future
architecture implements HW_TAGS but not init.
Thanks,
-- Marco
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