[PATCH 00/11] i.MX8MM power domain support

[Lucas Stach]

Hi Peng,

On Mi, 2020-10-14 at 01:23 +0000, Peng Fan wrote:
[...]
> > > > > 3. either 8MM, 8MN, or 8MP, the power domain design is different,
> > > > > I am not
> > > > sure if it is the good to add hundreds line of code in GPCv2 each
> > > > time
> > > > >   a new SOC is added.
> > > > 
> > > > I don't buy into this argument. We have lots of drivers in the Linux
> > > > kernel that require some changes for new SoC generations, that's
> > > > what Linux drivers are for. The complexity of the hardware doesn't
> > > > disappear just because you push some of the driver bits into TF-A,
> > > > you just handle the complexity at a different palce and IMHO that
> > > > the wrong place. The power domains have complex interactions with
> > > > other drivers in the Linux system, so debugging and deplyong fixes
> > > > is much easier when the power domain handling is fully done by a kernel
> > driver.
> > > Actually, due to the security requirement from other system solution
> > > provider, for example, Microsoft Azure Sphere, it has strict
> > > requirement for power domain to be controlled by secure subsystem(either
> > TF-A, TEE or dedicated secure domain controller).
> > > Same requirement for reset control, and system critical clock control.
> > 
> > Yes, I'm aware of those requirements, but to satisfy those you need a full
> > implementation of all those parts in the secure subsystem. Doing it just for the
> > power domains adds complexity for no gain, as you still won't be able to meet
> > all the requirements and frankly I don't think this is a realistic goal to achieve
> > with the current i.MX8M family of SoCs.
> 
> At least we are moving to that direction.

To me it seems like the current way (custom TF-A interface and
implementation) is one step in the right direction, but two steps
backwards in terms of complexity.

> > Meeting those requirements needs a fully system approach where the secure
> > subsystem parts are made sufficiently independent from the non- secure
> > parts on a hardware level, which I don't see on the i.MX8M SoC and hardware
> > design guide.
> 
> CSU could restrict the access permission.

While this is true, my argument is much broader and not only focused on
on-SoC peripherals. For example some of the power domains need
different voltages for specific performance states, which means you
need to communicate with a external PMIC or other voltage regulator,
which in turn means you need to set aside the necessary i2c bus and/or
GPIO banks required for this communication at system design time, so it
isn't shared between TF-A and the rich OS. I don't see this in any of
the i.MX8M designs.

> > > For NXP i.MX8M family, it is ok to implement in linux kernel, just a
> > > tradeoff to find out a place to hide the complexity ^_^.
> > > 
> > > BTW, for virtualization support, it is better to put the power domain
> > > in a central place to simplify the VM implementation.
> > 
> > Same as above. If you can make all the relevant bits (clock, reset,
> > power-domain, regulator) available via a virtualization friendly API, then I
> > would see a point in adding complexity for this abstraction. As long as this
> > added abstraction only solves a very tiny bit of the overall picture, I just don't
> > see the point in the added complexity and (from a Linux PoV) obfuscation.
> 
> Could we use SCMI for power domain, system critical clocks, smc watchdog
> and etc?

If you could demonstrate a working solution with all those pieces
hidden behind a standard SCMI interface, this would make for a much
more compelling story supporting the secure subsystem argument.

> Or we support two approaches, one is let Linux control everything, the other
> is using SCMI.
> 
> Thoughts?

I wouldn't be opposed to such a solution. If you can put all this
behind a standard SCMI interface, I guess we wouldn't need two
different SoC specific drivers for the same purpose, so we could easily
have a Linux full-control solution (i.e. this patchset) coexist with a
SCMI based implementation, possibly with just a slightly different base
SoC DT with all the power domains, clocks and other system level
control stuff behind SCMI.

What I'm strongly opposed to is having a custom TF-A interface and all
the added complexity for little to no gain in actual system security.

Regards,
Lucas