[PATCH] lib: sbi: sse: fix shared memory double-fetch in sse_write_attrs
liutong
liutong at iscas.ac.cn
Wed Nov 4 17:39:58 PST 2026
sse_write_attrs() reads the attribute values from the S-mode shared
memory in two passes: first to validate them, then to apply them.
S-mode may write the shared memory between the passes, so a value that
sse_event_set_attr_check() would have rejected can still be applied.
For SBI_SSE_ATTR_PREFERRED_HART this leaves e->hartindex derived from
a hart id that sse_event_set_hart_id_check() refused, which
sbi_sse_enable() then resolves to a NULL scratch.
Copy the attributes into a local array, unmap the shared memory right
away, and run both passes against that copy.
The copy is a fixed size stack array. Its bound is currently guaranteed
by sbi_sse_attr_check() in the only caller. Check attr_count here as
well, so that the bound of the array does not depend on validation done
in another function.
Fixes: c8cdf01d8f3a ("lib: sbi: Add support for Supervisor Software Events extension")
Suggested-by: Himanshu Chauhan <himanshu.chauhan at oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: liutong <liutong at iscas.ac.cn>
---
Resent on its own from "[PATCH v3 0/3] lib: sbi: fix shared memory
double-fetch in DBTR and SSE":
https://lore.kernel.org/opensbi/20260910052958.3365324-4-liutong@iscas.ac.cn/
Himanshu NAKed that series on a debug trigger argument. This one is a
different subsystem, so I would rather it be judged on its own; if the
NAK was meant to cover it too, say so and I will drop it.
The attribute that matters is PREFERRED_HART: winning the race stores a
hart id that sse_event_set_hart_id_check() refused, e->hartindex becomes
-1U, and sbi_sse_enable() then dereferences a NULL scratch. Measured on
f6abdaf2 under QEMU MTTCG, -smp 2: unpatched, won in 6 rounds, and
SSE_ENABLE then takes an M-mode load access fault (mcause=0x5,
mtval=0x540); patched, 20000 rounds with no win.
Unchanged from v3 apart from the commit message, which overstated the
bound check: it covers attr_count only.
lib/sbi/sbi_sse.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/sbi/sbi_sse.c b/lib/sbi/sbi_sse.c
index 767ea128..b3d35d65 100644
--- a/lib/sbi/sbi_sse.c
+++ b/lib/sbi/sbi_sse.c
@@ -1049,25 +1049,40 @@ static int sse_write_attrs(struct sbi_sse_event *e, uint32_t base_attr_id,
unsigned long attr = 0, val;
uint32_t id, end_id = base_attr_id + attr_count;
unsigned long *attrs = (unsigned long *)input_phys;
+ unsigned long local_attrs[SBI_SSE_ATTR_MAX];
+
+ /*
+ * sbi_sse_attr_check() in the only caller already rejects a larger
+ * count, but local_attrs is a fixed size stack array, so do not
+ * rely on that for its bound.
+ */
+ if (attr_count > SBI_SSE_ATTR_MAX)
+ return SBI_ERR_INVALID_PARAM;
sbi_hart_protection_temp_map_range(input_phys, sizeof(unsigned long) * attr_count);
+ /*
+ * Snapshot the attributes so that the values checked below are the
+ * ones applied, even though S-mode can keep writing the shared
+ * memory.
+ */
+ copy_attrs(local_attrs, attrs, attr_count);
+
+ sbi_hart_protection_temp_unmap_range(input_phys, sizeof(unsigned long) * attr_count);
+
for (id = base_attr_id; id < end_id; id++) {
- val = attrs[attr++];
+ val = local_attrs[attr++];
ret = sse_event_set_attr_check(e, id, val);
if (ret)
- goto out;
+ return ret;
}
attr = 0;
for (id = base_attr_id; id < end_id; id++) {
- val = attrs[attr++];
+ val = local_attrs[attr++];
sse_event_set_attr(e, id, val);
}
-out:
- sbi_hart_protection_temp_unmap_range(input_phys, sizeof(unsigned long) * attr_count);
-
return ret;
}
base-commit: f6abdaf25dfe0608277fc634f3927c1f184ede6d
--
2.34.1
More information about the opensbi
mailing list