[PATCH v13 04/15] arm64: kexec_file: Fix potential buffer overflow in prepare_elf_headers()

Jinjie Ruan ruanjinjie at huawei.com
Mon May 11 04:30:44 PDT 2026



On 5/11/2026 5:46 PM, Breno Leitao wrote:
> On Mon, May 11, 2026 at 11:04:43AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote:
>> There is a race condition between the kexec_load() system call
>> (crash kernel loading path) and memory hotplug operations that can
>> lead to buffer overflow and potential kernel crash.
>>
>> During prepare_elf_headers(), the following steps occur:
>> 1. The first for_each_mem_range() queries current System RAM memory ranges
>> 2. Allocates buffer based on queried count
>> 3. The 2st for_each_mem_range() populates ranges from memblock
>>
>> If memory hotplug occurs between step 1 and step 3, the number of ranges
>> can increase, causing out-of-bounds write when populating cmem->ranges[].
>>
>> This happens because kexec_load() uses kexec_trylock (atomic_t) while
>> memory hotplug uses device_hotplug_lock (mutex), so they don't serialize
>> with each other.
>>
>> Add the explicit bounds checking to prevent out-of-bounds access.
> 
> It seems you have a TOCTOU type of issue, and this seems to be shrinking
> the window, but not fully solving it?

Hi Breno,

Thanks for your comments regarding the TOCTOU issue.

You are correct that the current bounds checking only "shrinks the
window" and prevents a kernel crash, but doesn't fully guarantee header
consistency if a race occurs.

In my local environment, this race is extremely difficult to reproduce,
but it is theoretically possible.

To address this properly for arm64, I am considering two steps:

- For this patch: I will change the return value to -EAGAIN and keep the
bounds check. This ensures that even if a race happens, the kernel
remains safe (no OOB access), and user-space is notified to retry.

- Long-term solution: A better way to solve this is to implement ARM64
CRASH_HOTPLUG support (similar to x86). With crash hotplug, the kernel
will automatically re-generate the crash headers whenever a memory
hotplug event occurs. This makes the TOCTOU during the initial
kexec_load less critical, as any transient inconsistency will be
immediately corrected by the subsequent hotplug handler.

Does it make sense to you to use this patch as a safety guard first, and
then I (or someone else) follow up with the full CRASH_HOTPLUG support
for arm64 as [1]?

[1]:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260402081459.635022-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/

Best regards,
Jinjie

> 
>> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>
>> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon at arm.com>
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe at redhat.com>
>> Cc: Breno Leitao <leitao at debian.org>
>> Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
>> Fixes: 3751e728cef2 ("arm64: kexec_file: add crash dump support")
>> Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260323072745.2481719-1-ruanjinjie%40huawei.com
>> Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie at huawei.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 5 +++++
>>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
>> index e31fabed378a..a67e7b1abbab 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
>> @@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ static int prepare_elf_headers(void **addr, unsigned long *sz)
>>  	cmem->max_nr_ranges = nr_ranges;
>>  	cmem->nr_ranges = 0;
>>  	for_each_mem_range(i, &start, &end) {
>> +		if (cmem->nr_ranges >= cmem->max_nr_ranges) {
>> +			ret = -ENOMEM;
> 
> -ENOMEM seems to be the the wrong errno. This isn't an allocation
> failure; it's a transient race. -EBUSY or -EAGAIN would be more honest




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