[PATCH v15 11/23] x86: kexec_file: Fix TOCTOU buffer overflow via memory region padding

[Jinjie Ruan]

Sashiko AI code review pointed out there is a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check to
Time-of-Use) race condition in prepare_elf_headers() between the initial
pass that counts System RAM ranges and the second pass that populates them.
If a memory hotplug event occurs between these two steps, the number of
memory regions may increase, causing an out-of-bounds write to
the cmem->ranges[] array.

Fix this fundamentally by using `CRASH_HOTPLUG_SAFETY_PADDING`(128 slots)
to expand the flexible array allocation ceiling upfront. This safely
absorbs any concurrent memory region expansion. Concurrently, add
a defensive boundary check inside the callback to return -EAGAIN
on unexpected overrun, fully eradicating the overflow window and ensuring
system stability.

Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi at linaro.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx at kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo at redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp at alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa at zytor.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe at redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt at kernel.org>
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8d5f894a3108 ("x86: kexec_file: lift CRASH_MAX_RANGES limit on crash_mem buffer")
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie at huawei.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index cd796818d94d..a1089907728d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static struct crash_mem *fill_up_crash_elf_data(void)
 	 * But in order to lest the low 1M could be changed in the future,
 	 * (e.g. [start, 1M]), add a extra slot.
 	 */
-	nr_ranges += 3 + crashk_cma_cnt;
+	nr_ranges += 3 + crashk_cma_cnt + CRASH_HOTPLUG_SAFETY_PADDING;
 	cmem = vzalloc(struct_size(cmem, ranges, nr_ranges));
 	if (!cmem)
 		return NULL;
@@ -226,6 +226,9 @@ static int prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
 {
 	struct crash_mem *cmem = arg;
 
+	if (unlikely(cmem->nr_ranges >= cmem->max_nr_ranges))
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
 	cmem->ranges[cmem->nr_ranges].start = res->start;
 	cmem->ranges[cmem->nr_ranges].end = res->end;
 	cmem->nr_ranges++;
-- 
2.34.1