[PATCH v12 10/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall

[Deepak Gupta]

On Mon, Apr 07, 2025 at 12:50:35PM +0800, Zong Li wrote:
>On Sat, Mar 15, 2025 at 5:39 AM Deepak Gupta <debug at rivosinc.com> wrote:
>>
>> As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this
>> syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the
>> existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the
>> security requirements for shadow stack memory since they lead to windows
>> where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not
>> properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack()
>> has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page.
>>
>> This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require token
>> to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by itself. However to
>> provide compatibility and portability with other architectues, user mode
>> can specify token set flag.
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Zong Li <zong.li at sifive.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug at rivosinc.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile  |   1 +
>>  arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  2 files changed, 145 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
>> index 8d186bfced45..3a861d320654 100644
>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile
>> @@ -125,3 +125,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI)          += acpi.o
>>  obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA)        += acpi_numa.o
>>
>>  obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += bugs.o
>> +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) += usercfi.o
>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..24022809a7b5
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos, Inc.
>> + * Deepak Gupta <debug at rivosinc.com>
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/sched.h>
>> +#include <linux/bitops.h>
>> +#include <linux/types.h>
>> +#include <linux/mm.h>
>> +#include <linux/mman.h>
>> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>> +#include <linux/sizes.h>
>> +#include <linux/user.h>
>> +#include <linux/syscalls.h>
>> +#include <linux/prctl.h>
>> +#include <asm/csr.h>
>> +#include <asm/usercfi.h>
>> +
>> +#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *)
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen
>> + * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to
>> + * shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow
>> + * stack.
>> + */
>> +static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long *addr, unsigned long val)
>> +{
>> +       /*
>> +        * Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero
>> +        */
>> +       unsigned long swap = -1;
>> +
>> +       __enable_user_access();
>> +       asm goto(
>> +               ".option push\n"
>> +               ".option arch, +zicfiss\n"
>> +               "1: ssamoswap.d %[swap], %[val], %[addr]\n"
>
>Hi Deepak,
>It just came to my mind, do we need to ensure that menvcfg.SSE is not
>zero before executing the ssamoswap instruction? Since ssamoswap is
>not encoded using MOP, I’m wondering if we should make sure that
>executing ssamoswap won’t accidentally trigger an illegal instruction
>exception. Thanks.

FWFT patches turn SSE during early boot. There is a bug there though,
I need to check if those FWFT SBI call succeeded or not. If it failed
then itshould set a global variable indicating shadow stack can't be
turned on. And in that case this flow wouldn't be reachable. Soon I
will post v13 with these changes.

Thanks for noticing.
>
>> +               _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
>> +               RISCV_ACQUIRE_BARRIER
>> +               ".option pop\n"
>> +               : [swap] "=r" (swap), [addr] "+A" (*addr)
>> +               : [val] "r" (val)
>> +               : "memory"
>> +               : fault
>> +               );
>> +       __disable_user_access();
>> +       return swap;
>> +fault:
>> +       __disable_user_access();
>> +       return -1;
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.  A token is always XLEN wide
>> + * and aligned to XLEN.
>> + */
>> +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
>> +{
>> +       unsigned long addr;
>> +
>> +       /* Token must be aligned */
>> +       if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE))
>> +               return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +       /* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */
>> +       addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE;
>> +
>> +       if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long)ssp) == -1)
>> +               return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> +       if (token_addr)
>> +               *token_addr = addr;
>> +
>> +       return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
>> +                                          unsigned long token_offset, bool set_tok)
>> +{
>> +       int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
>> +       struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
>> +       unsigned long populate, tok_loc = 0;
>> +
>> +       if (addr)
>> +               flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
>> +
>> +       mmap_write_lock(mm);
>> +       addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags,
>> +                      VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &populate, NULL);
>> +       mmap_write_unlock(mm);
>> +
>> +       if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
>> +               goto out;
>> +
>> +       if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, &tok_loc)) {
>> +               vm_munmap(addr, size);
>> +               return -EINVAL;
>> +       }
>> +
>> +       addr = tok_loc;
>> +
>> +out:
>> +       return addr;
>> +}
>> +
>> +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
>> +{
>> +       bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN;
>> +       unsigned long aligned_size = 0;
>> +
>> +       if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack())
>> +               return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> +
>> +       /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */
>> +       if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN)
>> +               return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +       /*
>> +        * Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is available
>> +        * CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction
>> +        * itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't
>> +        * be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas
>> +        * which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since
>> +        * CSR_SSP is writeable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent
>> +        * to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architecture (because
>> +        * `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token
>> +        * flag in flags and if provided in flags, setup a token at the base.
>> +        */
>> +
>> +       /* If there isn't space for a token */
>> +       if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)
>> +               return -ENOSPC;
>> +
>> +       if (addr && (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
>> +               return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> +       aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
>> +       if (aligned_size < size)
>> +               return -EOVERFLOW;
>> +
>> +       return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok);
>> +}
>>
>> --
>> 2.34.1
>>