[PATCH] riscv: Define TASK_SIZE_MAX for __access_ok()

Alexandre Ghiti alex at ghiti.fr
Mon Mar 25 13:12:54 PDT 2024


Hi David, Mark,

On 25/03/2024 17:39, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 25, 2024 at 08:30:37AM +0100, Alexandre Ghiti wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> On 24/03/2024 20:42, David Laight wrote:
>>> ...
>>>> The use of alternatives allows to return right away if the buffer is
>>>> beyond the usable user address space, and it's not just "slightly
>>>> faster" for some cases (a very large buffer with only a few bytes being
>>>> beyond the limit or someone could fault-in all the user pages and fail
>>>> very late...etc). access_ok() is here to guarantee that such situations
>>>> don't happen, so actually it makes more sense to use an alternative to
>>>> avoid that.
>>> Is it really worth doing ANY optimisations for the -EFAULT path?
>>> They really don't happen.
>>>
>>> The only fault path that matters is the one that has to page in
>>> data from somewhere.
>> Which is completely avoided with a strict definition of access_ok(). I see
>> access_ok() as an already existing optimization of fault paths by avoiding
>> them entirely when they are bound to happen.
> I think the point that David is making is that address+size pairs that'd fail
> access_ok() *should* be rare, and hence it's a better trade-off to occasionally
> handle faults for those if it makes the common case of successful access_ok()
> smaller or faster. For any well-behaved userspace applications, access_ok()
> should practically never fail, since userspace should be passing good
> address+size pairs as arguments to syscalls.
>
> Using a compile-time constant TASK_SIZE_MAX allows the compiler to generate
> much better code for access_ok(), and on arm64 we use a compile-time constant
> even when our page table depth can change at runtime (and when native/compat
> task sizes differ). The only abosolute boundary that needs to be maintained is
> that access_ok() fails for kernel addresses.


Hmm indeed I had completely misunderstood David's point, but actually 
not really since I disagreed with what he actually meant :)

But I had not realized access_ok() was so performance-sensitive and also 
missed the point that it was to protect the kernel more than making sure 
the userspace address is correct, so I guess we are good to go with 
Samuel's patch.

Thanks David and Mark,

Alex


>
> Mark.
>
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