[PATCH RFC v2 riscv/for-next 0/5] Enable ftrace with kernel preemption for RISC-V

Alexandre Ghiti alex at ghiti.fr
Thu Mar 7 05:21:25 PST 2024


Hi Andy,

On 07/03/2024 13:27, Andy Chiu wrote:
> Hi Alex,
>
> On Thu, Mar 7, 2024 at 4:57 AM Alexandre Ghiti <alex at ghiti.fr> wrote:
>> Hi Evgenii,
>>
>> On 21/02/2024 17:55, Evgenii Shatokhin wrote:
>>> On 21.02.2024 08:27, Andy Chiu wrote:
>>>> «Внимание! Данное письмо от внешнего адресата!»
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 3:42 AM Evgenii Shatokhin
>>>> <e.shatokhin at yadro.com> wrote:
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>
>>>>> On 13.09.2022 12:42, Andy Chiu wrote:
>>>>>> This patch removes dependency of dynamic ftrace from calling
>>>>>> stop_machine(), and makes it compatiable with kernel preemption.
>>>>>> Originally, we ran into stack corruptions, or execution of partially
>>>>>> updated instructions when starting or stopping ftrace on a fully
>>>>>> preemptible kernel configuration. The reason is that kernel
>>>>>> periodically
>>>>>> calls rcu_momentary_dyntick_idle() on cores waiting for the
>>>>>> code-patching
>>>>>> core running in ftrace. Though rcu_momentary_dyntick_idle() itself is
>>>>>> marked as notrace, it would call a bunch of tracable functions if we
>>>>>> configured the kernel as preemptible. For example, these are some
>>>>>> functions
>>>>>> that happened to have a symbol and have not been marked as notrace
>>>>>> on a
>>>>>> RISC-V preemptible kernel compiled with GCC-11:
>>>>>>     - __rcu_report_exp_rnp()
>>>>>>     - rcu_report_exp_cpu_mult()
>>>>>>     - rcu_preempt_deferred_qs()
>>>>>>     - rcu_preempt_need_deferred_qs()
>>>>>>     - rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_irqrestore()
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thus, this make it not ideal for us to rely on stop_machine() and
>>>>>> handly marked "notrace"s to perform runtime code patching. To remove
>>>>>> such dependency, we must make updates of code seemed atomic on running
>>>>>> cores. This might not be obvious for RISC-V since it usaually uses
>>>>>> a pair
>>>>>> of AUIPC + JALR to perform a long jump, which cannot be modified and
>>>>>> executed concurrently if we consider preemptions. As such, this patch
>>>>>> proposed a way to make it possible. It embeds a 32-bit rel-address
>>>>>> data
>>>>>> into instructions of each ftrace prologue and jumps indirectly. In
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> way, we could store and load the address atomically so that the code
>>>>>> patching core could run simutaneously with the rest of running cores.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> After applying the patchset, we compiled a preemptible kernel with all
>>>>>> tracers and ftrace-selftest enabled, and booted it on a 2-core QEMU
>>>>>> virt
>>>>>> machine. The kernel could boot up successfully, passing all ftrace
>>>>>> testsuits. Besides, we ran a script that randomly pick a tracer on
>>>>>> every
>>>>>> 0~5 seconds. The kernel has sustained over 20K rounds of the test. In
>>>>>> contrast, a preemptible kernel without our patch would panic in few
>>>>>> rounds on the same machine.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Though we ran into errors when using hwlat or irqsoff tracers together
>>>>>> with cpu-online stressor from stress-ng on a preemptible kernel. We
>>>>>> believe the reason may be that  percpu workers of the tracers are
>>>>>> being
>>>>>> queued into unbounded workqueue when cpu get offlined and patches
>>>>>> will go
>>>>>> through tracing tree.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Additionally, we found patching of tracepoints unsafe since the
>>>>>> instructions being patched are not naturally aligned. This may
>>>>>> result in
>>>>>> 2 half-word stores, which breaks atomicity, during the code patching.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> changes in patch v2:
>>>>>>     - Enforce alignments on all functions with a compiler workaround.
>>>>>>     - Support 64bit addressing for ftrace targets if xlen == 64
>>>>>>     - Initialize ftrace target addresses to avoid calling bad
>>>>>> address in a
>>>>>>       hypothesized case.
>>>>>>     - Use LGPTR instead of SZPTR since .align is log-scaled for
>>>>>>       mcount-dyn.S
>>>>>>     - Require the nop instruction of all jump_labels aligns
>>>>>> naturally on
>>>>>>       4B.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy Chiu (5):
>>>>>>      riscv: align ftrace to 4 Byte boundary and increase ftrace
>>>>>> prologue
>>>>>>        size
>>>>>>      riscv: export patch_insn_write
>>>>>>      riscv: ftrace: use indirect jump to work with kernel preemption
>>>>>>      riscv: ftrace: do not use stop_machine to update code
>>>>>>      riscv: align arch_static_branch function
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/Makefile                 |   2 +-
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h     |  24 ----
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/include/asm/jump_label.h |   2 +
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/include/asm/patch.h      |   1 +
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c          | 179
>>>>>> ++++++++++++++++++++--------
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/kernel/mcount-dyn.S      |  69 ++++++++---
>>>>>>     arch/riscv/kernel/patch.c           |   4 +-
>>>>>>     7 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
>>>>>>
>>>>> First of all, thank you for working on making dynamic Ftrace robust in
>>>>> preemptible kernels on RISC-V.
>>>>> It is an important use case but, for now, dynamic Ftrace and related
>>>>> tracers cannot be safely used with such kernels.
>>>>>
>>>>> Are there any updates on this series?
>>>>> It needs a rebase, of course, but it looks doable.
>>>>>
>>>>> If I understand the discussion correctly, the only blocker was that
>>>>> using "-falign-functions" was not enough to properly align cold
>>>>> functions and "-fno-guess-branch-probability" would likely have a
>>>>> performance cost.
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems, GCC developers have recently provided a workaround for that
>>>>> (https://gcc.gnu.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=gcc.git;h=0f5a9a00e3ab1fe96142f304cfbcf3f63b15f326,
>>>>>
>>>>> https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=88345#c24).
>>>>>
>>>>> "-fmin-function-alignment" should help but, I do not know, which GCC
>>>>> versions have got that patch already. In the meantime, one could
>>>>> probably check if "-fmin-function-alignment" is supported by the
>>>>> compiler and use it, if it is.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thoughts?
>>>> Hi Evgenii,
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for the update. Indeed, it is essential to this patch for
>>>> toolchain to provide forced alignment. We can test this flag in the
>>>> Makefile to sort out if toolchain supports it or not. Meanwhile, I had
>>>> figured out a way for this to work on any 2-B align addresses but
>>>> hadn't implemented it out yet. Basically it would require more
>>>> patching space for us to do software alignment. I would opt for a
>>>> special toolchain flag if the toolchain just supports it.
>>>>
>>>> Let me take some time to look and get back to you soon.
>>> Thank you! Looking forward to it.
>>>
>>> In case it helps, here is what I have checked so far.
>>>
>>> 1.
>>> I added the patch
>>> https://gcc.gnu.org/git/?p=gcc.git;a=patch;h=0f5a9a00e3ab1fe96142f304cfbcf3f63b15f326
>>> to the current revision of GCC 13.2.0 from RISC-V toolchain.
>>>
>>> Rebased your patchset on top of Linux 6.8-rc4 (mostly - context
>>> changes, SYM_FUNC_START/SYM_FUNC_END for asm symbols, etc.).
>>>
>>> Reverted 8547649981e6 ("riscv: ftrace: Fixup panic by disabling
>>> preemption").
>>>
>>> Switched from -falign-functions=4 to -fmin-function-alignment=4:
>>> ------------------
>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/Makefile b/arch/riscv/Makefile
>>> index b33b787c8b07..dcd0adeebaae 100644
>>> --- a/arch/riscv/Makefile
>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/Makefile
>>> @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE),y)
>>>       LDFLAGS_vmlinux += --no-relax
>>>       KBUILD_CPPFLAGS += -DCC_USING_PATCHABLE_FUNCTION_ENTRY
>>>   ifeq ($(CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C),y)
>>> -    CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -fpatchable-function-entry=12 -falign-functions=4
>>> +    CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -fpatchable-function-entry=12
>>> -fmin-function-alignment=4
>>>   else
>>> -    CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -fpatchable-function-entry=6 -falign-functions=4
>>> +    CC_FLAGS_FTRACE := -fpatchable-function-entry=6
>>> -fmin-function-alignment=4
>>>   endif
>>>   endif
>>>
>>> ------------------
>>>
>>> As far as I can see from objdump, the functions that were not aligned
>>> at 4-byte boundary with -falign-functions=4, are now aligned correctly
>>> with -fmin-function-alignment=4.
>>>
>>> 2.
>>> I tried the kernel in a QEMU VM with 2 CPUs and "-machine virt".
>>>
>>> The boottime tests for Ftrace had passed, except the tests for
>>> function_graph. I described the failure and the possible fix here:
>>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/dcc5976d-635a-4710-92df-94a99653314e@yadro.com/
>>>
>>>
>>> 3.
>>> There were also boottime warnings about "RCU not on for:
>>> arch_cpu_idle+0x0/0x2c". These are probably not related to your
>>> patchset, but rather to the fact that Ftrace is enabled in a
>>> preemptble kernel where RCU does different things.
>>>
>>> As a workaround, I disabled tracing of arch_cpu_idle() for now:
>>> ------------------
>>> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
>>> index 92922dbd5b5c..6abeecbfc51d 100644
>>> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
>>> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
>>> @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
>>>
>>>   extern asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void);
>>>
>>> -void arch_cpu_idle(void)
>>> +void noinstr arch_cpu_idle(void)
>>>   {
>>>       cpu_do_idle();
>>>   }
>>
>> I came up with the same fix for this, based on a similar fix for s390. I
>> have a patch ready and will send it soon since to me, it is a fix, not a
>> workaround.
> Just making sure we aren't duplicating works. Are you also working on
> getting rid of stop_machine() while patching ftrace entries? Or to
> provide a patch to fix the issue in arch_cpu_idle()? I was just about
> to restart my patchset for the first purpose. In case if I missed
> anything, could you help pointing me to the patchset if it's already
> on the ML?


I'm currently trying to fix ftrace because I noticed that the ftrace 
kselftests triggered a lot of panics and warning. For now I only fixed 
this one ^.

But TBH, I have started thinking about the issue your patch is trying to 
deal with. IIUC you're trying to avoid traps (or silent errors) that 
could happen because of concurrent accesses when patching is happening 
on a pair auipc/jarl.

I'm wondering if instead, we could not actually handle the potential 
traps: before storing the auipc + jalr pair, we could use a 
well-identified trapping instruction that could be recognized in the 
trap handler as a legitimate trap. For example:


auipc   -->  auipc  --> XXXX  -->  XXXX  -->  auipc
jalr              XXXX        XXXX        jalr             jalr


If a core traps on a XXXX instruction, we know this address is being 
patched, so we can return and probably the patching will be over. We 
could also identify half patched word instruction (I mean with only XX).

But please let me know if that's completely stupid and I did not 
understand the problem, since my patchset to support svvptc, I am 
wondering if it is not more performant to actually take very unlikely 
traps instead of trying to avoid them.

Thanks,

Alex


>> Thanks,
>>
>> Alex
>>
>>
>>> ------------------
>>>
>>> 4.
>>> Stress-testing revealed an issue though, which I do not understand yet.
>>>
>>> Probably similar to what you did earlier, I ran a script that switched
>>> the current tracer to "function", "function_graph", "nop", "blk" each
>>> 1-5 seconds. In another shell, "stress-ng --hrtimers 1" was running.
>>>
>>> The kernel usually crashed within a few minutes, in seemingly random
>>> locations, but often in one of two ways:
>>>
>>> (a) Invalid instruction, because the address of ftrace_caller function
>>> was somehow written to the body of the traced function rather than
>>> just to the Ftrace prologue.
>>>
>>> In the following example, the crash happened at 0xffffffff800d3398.
>>> "b0 d7" is actually not part of the code here, but rather the lower
>>> bytes of 0xffffffff8000d7b0, the address of ftrace_caller() in this
>>> kernel.
>>>
>>> (gdb) disas /r 0xffffffff800d3382,+0x20
>>> Dump of assembler code from 0xffffffff800d3382 to 0xffffffff800d33a2:
>>> ...
>>>     0xffffffff800d3394 <clockevents_program_event+144>:  ba 87   mv a5,a4
>>>     0xffffffff800d3396 <clockevents_program_event+146>:  c1 bf   j
>>> 0xffffffff800d3366 <clockevents_program_event+98>
>>>     0xffffffff800d3398 <clockevents_program_event+148>:  b0 d7   sw
>>> a2,104(a5) // 0xffffffff8000d7b0, the address of ftrace_caller().
>>>     0xffffffff800d339a <clockevents_program_event+150>:  00 80   .2byte
>>> 0x8000
>>>     0xffffffff800d339c <clockevents_program_event+152>:  ff ff   .2byte
>>> 0xffff
>>>     0xffffffff800d339e <clockevents_program_event+154>:  ff ff   .2byte
>>> 0xffff
>>>     0xffffffff800d33a0 <clockevents_program_event+156>:  d5 bf   j
>>> 0xffffffff800d3394 <clockevents_program_event+144
>>>
>>> The backtrace usually contains one or more occurrences of
>>> return_to_handler() in this case.
>>>
>>> [  260.520394] [<ffffffff800d3398>] clockevents_program_event+0xac/0x100
>>> [  260.521195] [<ffffffff8000d2bc>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
>>> [  260.521843] [<ffffffff800c50ba>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x122/0x20c
>>> [  260.522492] [<ffffffff8000d2bc>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
>>> [  260.523132] [<ffffffff8009785e>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x9e/0x1ec
>>> [  260.523788] [<ffffffff8000d2bc>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
>>> [  260.524437] [<ffffffff8000d2bc>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
>>> [  260.525080] [<ffffffff80a8acfa>] handle_riscv_irq+0x4a/0x74
>>> [  260.525726] [<ffffffff80a97b9a>] call_on_irq_stack+0x32/0x40
>>> ----------------------
>>>
>>> (b) Jump to an invalid location, e.g. to the middle of a valid 4-byte
>>> instruction. %ra usually points right after the last instruction,
>>> "jalr   a2", in return_to_handler() in such cases, so the jump was
>>> likely made from there.
>>>
>>> The problem is reproducible, although I have not found what causes it
>>> yet.
>>>
>>> Any help is appreciated, of course.
>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> Evgenii
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Andy
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> linux-riscv mailing list
>>> linux-riscv at lists.infradead.org
>>> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
> Thanks,
> Andy
>
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