[PATCH] randomize_kstack: Remove non-functional per-arch entropy filtering
liuyuntao (F)
liuyuntao12 at huawei.com
Wed Jun 19 20:47:58 PDT 2024
On 2024/6/20 5:47, Kees Cook wrote:
> An unintended consequence of commit 9c573cd31343 ("randomize_kstack:
> Improve entropy diffusion") was that the per-architecture entropy size
> filtering reduced how many bits were being added to the mix, rather than
> how many bits were being used during the offsetting. All architectures
> fell back to the existing default of 0x3FF (10 bits), which will consume
> at most 1KiB of stack space. It seems that this is working just fine,
> so let's avoid the confusion and update everything to use the default.
>
My original intent was indeed to do this, but I regret that not being
more explicit in the commit log..
Additionally, I've tested the stack entropy by applying the following
patch, the result was `Bits of stack entropy: 7` on arm64, too. It does
not seem to affect the entropy value, maybe removing it is OK, or there
may be some nuances of your intentions that I've overlooked.
--- a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
+++ b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h
@@ -79,9 +79,7 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u32, kstack_offset);
#define choose_random_kstack_offset(rand) do { \
if (static_branch_maybe(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT, \
&randomize_kstack_offset)) { \
- u32 offset = raw_cpu_read(kstack_offset); \
- offset = ror32(offset, 5) ^ (rand); \
- raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, offset); \
+ raw_cpu_write(kstack_offset, rand); \
} \
} while (0)
#else /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET */
> The prior intent of the per-architecture limits were:
>
> arm64: capped at 0x1FF (9 bits), 5 bits effective
> powerpc: uncapped (10 bits), 6 or 7 bits effective
> riscv: uncapped (10 bits), 6 bits effective
> x86: capped at 0xFF (8 bits), 5 (x86_64) or 6 (ia32) bits effective
> s390: capped at 0xFF (8 bits), undocumented effective entropy
>
> Current discussion has led to just dropping the original per-architecture
> filters. The additional entropy appears to be safe for arm64, x86,
> and s390. Quoting Arnd, "There is no point pretending that 15.75KB is
> somehow safe to use while 15.00KB is not."
>
> Co-developed-by: Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12 at huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yuntao Liu <liuyuntao12 at huawei.com>
> Fixes: 9c573cd31343 ("randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion")
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240617133721.377540-1-liuyuntao12@huawei.com
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees at kernel.org>
> ---
> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd at arndb.de>
> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland at arm.com>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 16 +++++++---------
> arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 15 ++++++---------
> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
> index ad198262b981..7230f6e20ab8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c
> @@ -53,17 +53,15 @@ static void invoke_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int scno,
> syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, 0, ret);
>
> /*
> - * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
> - * but not enough for arm64 stack utilization comfort. To keep
> - * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 9 bits.
> + * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10
> + * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
> + * when applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
> + * 16-byte aligned SP at function boundaries, which will remove the
> + * 4 low bits from any entropy chosen here.
> *
> - * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
> - * applying stack alignment constraints: the AAPCS mandates a
> - * 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned SP at function boundaries.
> - *
> - * The resulting 5 bits of entropy is seen in SP[8:4].
> + * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4].
> */
> - choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16() & 0x1FF);
> + choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16());
> }
>
> static inline bool has_syscall_work(unsigned long flags)
> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h
> index 7f5004065e8a..35555c944630 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h
> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/entry-common.h
> @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
> static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
> unsigned long ti_work)
> {
> - choose_random_kstack_offset(get_tod_clock_fast() & 0xff);
> + choose_random_kstack_offset(get_tod_clock_fast());
> }
>
> #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> index 7e523bb3d2d3..fb2809b20b0a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
> @@ -73,19 +73,16 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
> #endif
>
> /*
> - * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(),
> - * but not enough for x86 stack utilization comfort. To keep
> - * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 8 bits.
> - *
> - * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when
> - * applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in
> + * This value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), which is 10
> + * bits. The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler
> + * when applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in
> * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32)
> * low bits from any entropy chosen here.
> *
> - * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or
> - * 6 (ia32) bits.
> + * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 7 (x86_64) or
> + * 8 (ia32) bits.
> */
> - choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF);
> + choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
> }
> #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
>
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