[musl] Re: [PATCH v8 00/38] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace
Rich Felker
dalias at libc.org
Tue Feb 20 10:57:15 PST 2024
On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 06:41:05PM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I worked on the x86 kernel shadow stack support. I think it is an
> interesting suggestion. Some questions below, and I will think more on
> it.
>
> On Tue, 2024-02-20 at 11:36 -0500, Stefan O'Rear wrote:
> > While discussing the ABI implications of shadow stacks in the context
> > of
> > Zicfiss and musl a few days ago, I had the following idea for how to
> > solve
> > the source compatibility problems with shadow stacks in POSIX.1-2004
> > and
> > POSIX.1-2017:
> >
> > 1. Introduce a "flexible shadow stack handling" option. For what
> > follows,
> > it doesn't matter if this is system-wide, per-mm, or per-vma.
> >
> > 2. Shadow stack faults on non-shadow stack pages, if flexible shadow
> > stack
> > handling is in effect, cause the affected page to become a shadow
> > stack
> > page. When this happens, the page filled with invalid address
> > tokens.
>
> Hmm, could the shadow stack underflow onto the real stack then? Not
> sure how bad that is. INCSSP (incrementing the SSP register on x86)
> loops are not rare so it seems like something that could happen.
Shadow stack underflow should fault on attempt to access
non-shadow-stack memory as shadow-stack, no?
> > Faults from non-shadow-stack accesses to a shadow-stack page which
> > was
> > created by the previous paragraph will cause the page to revert to
> > non-shadow-stack usage, with or without clearing.
>
> Won't this prevent catching stack overflows when they happen? An
> overflow will just turn the shadow stack into normal stack and only get
> detected when the shadow stack unwinds?
I don't think that's as big a problem as it sounds like. It might make
pinpointing the spot at which things went wrong take a little bit more
work, but it should not admit any wrong-execution.
> A related question would be how to handle the expanding nature of the
> initial stack. I guess the initial stack could be special and have a
> separate shadow stack.
That seems fine.
> > Important: a shadow stack operation can only load a valid address
> > from
> > a page if that page has been in continuous shadow stack use since
> > the
> > address was written by another shadow stack operation; the
> > flexibility
> > delays error reporting in cases of stray writes but it never
> > allows for
> > corruption of shadow stack operation.
>
> Shadow stacks currently have automatic guard gaps to try to prevent one
> thread from overflowing onto another thread's shadow stack. This would
> somewhat opens that up, as the stack guard gaps are usually maintained
> by userspace for new threads. It would have to be thought through if
> these could still be enforced with checking at additional spots.
I would think the existing guard pages would already do that if a
thread's shadow stack is contiguous with its own data stack.
> > 3. Standards-defined operations which use a user-provided stack
> > (makecontext, sigaltstack, pthread_attr_setstack) use a subrange
> > of the
> > provided stack for shadow stack storage. I propose to use a
> > shadow
> > stack size of 1/32 of the provided stack size, rounded up to a
> > positive
> > integer number of pages, and place the shadow stack allocation at
> > the
> > lowest page-aligned address inside the provided stack region.
> >
> > Since page usage is flexible, no change in page permissions is
> > immediately needed; this merely sets the initial shadow stack
> > pointer for
> > the new context.
> >
> > If the shadow stack grew in the opposite direction to the
> > architectural
> > stack, it would not be necessary to pick a fixed direction.
> >
> > 4. SIGSTKSZ and MINSIGSTKSZ are increased by 2 pages to provide
> > sufficient
> > space for a minimum-sized shadow stack region and worst case
> > alignment.
>
> Do all makecontext() callers ensure the size is greater than this?
>
> I guess glibc's makecontext() could do this scheme to prevent leaking
> without any changes to the kernel. Basically steal a little of the
> stack address range and overwrite it with a shadow stack mapping. But
> only if the apps leave enough room. If they need to be updated, then
> they could be updated to manage their own shadow stacks too I think.
>From the musl side, I have always looked at the entirely of shadow
stack stuff with very heavy skepticism, and anything that breaks
existing interface contracts, introduced places where apps can get
auto-killed because a late resource allocation fails, or requires
applications to code around the existence of something that should be
an implementation detail, is a non-starter. To even consider shadow
stack support, it must truely be fully non-breaking.
> > _Without_ doing this, sigaltstack cannot be used to recover from
> > stack
> > overflows if the shadow stack limit is reached first, and makecontext
> > cannot be supported without memory leaks and unreportable error
> > conditions.
>
> FWIW, I think the makecontext() shadow stack leaking is a bad idea. I
> would prefer the existing makecontext() interface just didn't support
> shadow stack, rather than the leaking solution glibc does today.
AIUI the proposal by Stefan makes it non-leaking because it's just
using normal memory that reverts to normal usage on any
non-shadow-stack access.
Rich
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