[PATCH RFC/RFT 1/4] riscv: Stop emitting preventive sfence.vma for new vmalloc mappings

Alexandre Ghiti alexghiti at rivosinc.com
Fri Dec 8 06:28:06 PST 2023


Hi Christophe,

On Thu, Dec 7, 2023 at 4:52 PM Christophe Leroy
<christophe.leroy at csgroup.eu> wrote:
>
>
>
> Le 07/12/2023 à 16:03, Alexandre Ghiti a écrit :
> > In 6.5, we removed the vmalloc fault path because that can't work (see
> > [1] [2]). Then in order to make sure that new page table entries were
> > seen by the page table walker, we had to preventively emit a sfence.vma
> > on all harts [3] but this solution is very costly since it relies on IPI.
> >
> > And even there, we could end up in a loop of vmalloc faults if a vmalloc
> > allocation is done in the IPI path (for example if it is traced, see
> > [4]), which could result in a kernel stack overflow.
> >
> > Those preventive sfence.vma needed to be emitted because:
> >
> > - if the uarch caches invalid entries, the new mapping may not be
> >    observed by the page table walker and an invalidation may be needed.
> > - if the uarch does not cache invalid entries, a reordered access
> >    could "miss" the new mapping and traps: in that case, we would actually
> >    only need to retry the access, no sfence.vma is required.
> >
> > So this patch removes those preventive sfence.vma and actually handles
> > the possible (and unlikely) exceptions. And since the kernel stacks
> > mappings lie in the vmalloc area, this handling must be done very early
> > when the trap is taken, at the very beginning of handle_exception: this
> > also rules out the vmalloc allocations in the fault path.
> >
> > Note that for now, we emit a sfence.vma even for uarchs that do not
> > cache invalid entries as we have no means to know that: that will be
> > fixed in the next patch.
> >
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230531093817.665799-1-bjorn@kernel.org/ [1]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230801090927.2018653-1-dylan@andestech.com [2]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20230725132246.817726-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com/ [3]
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200508144043.13893-1-joro@8bytes.org/ [4]
> > Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti at rivosinc.com>
> > ---
> >   arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h  | 19 +++++-
> >   arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h |  5 ++
> >   arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c      |  5 ++
> >   arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S            | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   arch/riscv/mm/init.c                 |  2 +
> >   5 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> > index 3cb53c4df27c..a916cbc69d47 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> > @@ -37,7 +37,24 @@ static inline void flush_dcache_page(struct page *page)
> >       flush_icache_mm(vma->vm_mm, 0)
> >
> >   #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
> > -#define flush_cache_vmap(start, end) flush_tlb_kernel_range(start, end)
> > +extern u64 new_vmalloc[];
>
> Can you have the table size here ? Would help GCC static analysis for
> boundary checking.

Yes, I'll do

>
> > +extern char _end[];
> > +#define flush_cache_vmap flush_cache_vmap
> > +static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> > +{
> > +     if ((start < VMALLOC_END && end > VMALLOC_START) ||
> > +         (start < MODULES_END && end > MODULES_VADDR)) {
>
> Can you use is_vmalloc_or_module_addr() instead ?

Yes, I'll do

>
>
> > +             int i;
> > +
> > +             /*
> > +              * We don't care if concurrently a cpu resets this value since
> > +              * the only place this can happen is in handle_exception() where
> > +              * an sfence.vma is emitted.
> > +              */
> > +             for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS / sizeof(u64) + 1; ++i)
>
> Use ARRAY_SIZE() ?

And that too :)

Thanks for the review,

Alex

>
> > +                     new_vmalloc[i] = -1ULL;
> > +     }
> > +}
> >   #endif
> >
> >   #ifndef CONFIG_SMP
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > index 1833beb00489..8fe12fa6c329 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h
> > @@ -60,6 +60,11 @@ struct thread_info {
> >       long                    user_sp;        /* User stack pointer */
> >       int                     cpu;
> >       unsigned long           syscall_work;   /* SYSCALL_WORK_ flags */
> > +     /*
> > +      * Used in handle_exception() to save a0, a1 and a2 before knowing if we
> > +      * can access the kernel stack.
> > +      */
> > +     unsigned long           a0, a1, a2;
> >   };
> >
> >   /*
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > index d6a75aac1d27..340c1c84560d 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
> > @@ -34,10 +34,15 @@ void asm_offsets(void)
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S9, task_struct, thread.s[9]);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S10, task_struct, thread.s[10]);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_S11, task_struct, thread.s[11]);
> > +
> > +     OFFSET(TASK_TI_CPU, task_struct, thread_info.cpu);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_TI_FLAGS, task_struct, thread_info.flags);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_TI_PREEMPT_COUNT, task_struct, thread_info.preempt_count);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP, task_struct, thread_info.kernel_sp);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_TI_USER_SP, task_struct, thread_info.user_sp);
> > +     OFFSET(TASK_TI_A0, task_struct, thread_info.a0);
> > +     OFFSET(TASK_TI_A1, task_struct, thread_info.a1);
> > +     OFFSET(TASK_TI_A2, task_struct, thread_info.a2);
> >
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_F0,  task_struct, thread.fstate.f[0]);
> >       OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_F1,  task_struct, thread.fstate.f[1]);
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> > index 143a2bb3e697..3a3c7b563816 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
> > @@ -14,6 +14,88 @@
> >   #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
> >   #include <asm/errata_list.h>
> >
> > +.macro new_vmalloc_check
> > +     REG_S   a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp)
> > +     REG_S   a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp)
> > +     REG_S   a2, TASK_TI_A2(tp)
> > +
> > +     csrr    a0, CSR_CAUSE
> > +     /* Exclude IRQs */
> > +     blt     a0, zero, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +     /* Only check new_vmalloc if we are in page/protection fault */
> > +     li      a1, EXC_LOAD_PAGE_FAULT
> > +     beq     a0, a1, _new_vmalloc_kernel_address
> > +     li      a1, EXC_STORE_PAGE_FAULT
> > +     beq     a0, a1, _new_vmalloc_kernel_address
> > +     li      a1, EXC_INST_PAGE_FAULT
> > +     bne     a0, a1, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +
> > +_new_vmalloc_kernel_address:
> > +     /* Is it a kernel address? */
> > +     csrr    a0, CSR_TVAL
> > +     bge     a0, zero, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +
> > +     /* Check if a new vmalloc mapping appeared that could explain the trap */
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * Computes:
> > +      * a0 = &new_vmalloc[BIT_WORD(cpu)]
> > +      * a1 = BIT_MASK(cpu)
> > +      */
> > +     REG_L   a2, TASK_TI_CPU(tp)
> > +     /*
> > +      * Compute the new_vmalloc element position:
> > +      * (cpu / 64) * 8 = (cpu >> 6) << 3
> > +      */
> > +     srli    a1, a2, 6
> > +     slli    a1, a1, 3
> > +     la      a0, new_vmalloc
> > +     add     a0, a0, a1
> > +     /*
> > +      * Compute the bit position in the new_vmalloc element:
> > +      * bit_pos = cpu % 64 = cpu - (cpu / 64) * 64 = cpu - (cpu >> 6) << 6
> > +      *         = cpu - ((cpu >> 6) << 3) << 3
> > +      */
> > +     slli    a1, a1, 3
> > +     sub     a1, a2, a1
> > +     /* Compute the "get mask": 1 << bit_pos */
> > +     li      a2, 1
> > +     sll     a1, a2, a1
> > +
> > +     /* Check the value of new_vmalloc for this cpu */
> > +     ld      a2, 0(a0)
> > +     and     a2, a2, a1
> > +     beq     a2, zero, _new_vmalloc_restore_context
> > +
> > +     ld      a2, 0(a0)
> > +     not     a1, a1
> > +     and     a1, a2, a1
> > +     sd      a1, 0(a0)
> > +
> > +     /* Only emit a sfence.vma if the uarch caches invalid entries */
> > +     la      a0, tlb_caching_invalid_entries
> > +     lb      a0, 0(a0)
> > +     beqz    a0, _new_vmalloc_no_caching_invalid_entries
> > +     sfence.vma
> > +_new_vmalloc_no_caching_invalid_entries:
> > +     // debug
> > +     la      a0, nr_sfence_vma_handle_exception
> > +     li      a1, 1
> > +     amoadd.w    a0, a1, (a0)
> > +     // end debug
> > +     REG_L   a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp)
> > +     REG_L   a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp)
> > +     REG_L   a2, TASK_TI_A2(tp)
> > +     csrw    CSR_SCRATCH, x0
> > +     sret
> > +
> > +_new_vmalloc_restore_context:
> > +     REG_L   a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp)
> > +     REG_L   a1, TASK_TI_A1(tp)
> > +     REG_L   a2, TASK_TI_A2(tp)
> > +.endm
> > +
> > +
> >   SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception)
> >       /*
> >        * If coming from userspace, preserve the user thread pointer and load
> > @@ -25,6 +107,18 @@ SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception)
> >
> >   _restore_kernel_tpsp:
> >       csrr tp, CSR_SCRATCH
> > +
> > +     /*
> > +      * The RISC-V kernel does not eagerly emit a sfence.vma after each
> > +      * new vmalloc mapping, which may result in exceptions:
> > +      * - if the uarch caches invalid entries, the new mapping would not be
> > +      *   observed by the page table walker and an invalidation is needed.
> > +      * - if the uarch does not cache invalid entries, a reordered access
> > +      *   could "miss" the new mapping and traps: in that case, we only need
> > +      *   to retry the access, no sfence.vma is required.
> > +      */
> > +     new_vmalloc_check
> > +
> >       REG_S sp, TASK_TI_KERNEL_SP(tp)
> >
> >   #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
> > index 0798bd861dcb..379403de6c6f 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
> > @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@
> >
> >   #include "../kernel/head.h"
> >
> > +u64 new_vmalloc[NR_CPUS / sizeof(u64) + 1];
> > +
> >   struct kernel_mapping kernel_map __ro_after_init;
> >   EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_map);
> >   #ifdef CONFIG_XIP_KERNEL



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