[PATCH -next v4 3/4] arm64: mm: add support for page table check

Anshuman Khandual anshuman.khandual at arm.com
Tue Apr 19 22:05:53 PDT 2022



On 4/19/22 18:49, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 6:22 AM Anshuman Khandual
> <anshuman.khandual at arm.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4/18/22 09:14, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK
>>> +static inline bool pte_user_accessible_page(pte_t pte)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pte_present(pte) && (pte_user(pte) || pte_user_exec(pte));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pmd_user_accessible_page(pmd_t pmd)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pmd_present(pmd) && (pmd_user(pmd) || pmd_user_exec(pmd));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pud_user_accessible_page(pud_t pud)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pud_present(pud) && pud_user(pud);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>> Wondering why check for these page table entry states when init_mm
>> has already being excluded ? Should not user page tables be checked
>> for in entirety for all updates ? what is the rationale for filtering
>> out only pxx_user_access_page entries ?
> 
> The point is to prevent false sharing and memory corruption issues.
> The idea of PTC to be simple and relatively independent  from the MM
> state machine that catches invalid page sharing. I.e. if an R/W anon

Right, this mechanism here is truly interdependent validation, which is
orthogonal to other MM states. Although I was curious, if mm_struct is
not 'init_mm', what percentage of its total page table mapped entries
will be user accessible ? These new helpers only filter out entries that
could potentially create false sharing leading upto memory corruption ?

I am wondering if there is any other way such filtering could have been
applied without adding all these new page table helpers just for page
table check purpose.

> page is accessible by user land, that page can never be mapped into
> another process (internally shared anons are treated as named
> mappings).

Right.

> 
> Therefore, we try not to rely on MM states, and ensure that when a
> page-table entry is accessible by user it meets the required
> assumptions: no false sharing, etc.

Right, filtering reduces the page table entries that needs interception
during update (set/clear), but was just curious is there another way of
doing it, without adding page table check specific helpers on platforms
subscribing PAGE_TABLE_CHECK ?

> 
> For example, one bug that was caught with PTC was where a driver on an
> unload would put memory on a freelist but memory is still mapped in
> user page table.

Should not page's refcount (that it is being used else where) prevented
releases into free list ? But page table check here might just detect
such scenarios even before page gets released.



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