[PATCH V2 1/2] riscv: Add RISC-V svpbmt extension

Alexandre Ghiti alexandre.ghiti at canonical.com
Tue Sep 28 07:58:51 PDT 2021


On Tue, Sep 28, 2021 at 3:48 PM Philipp Tomsich
<philipp.tomsich at vrull.eu> wrote:
>
> Nick,
>
> On Tue, 28 Sept 2021 at 15:19, Nick Kossifidis <mick at ics.forth.gr> wrote:
> >
> > On 9/28/21 7:26 AM, Atish Patra wrote:
> > > On Mon, Sep 27, 2021 at 8:50 PM Anup Patel <anup at brainfault.org> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> On Tue, Sep 28, 2021 at 6:32 AM Nick Kossifidis <mick at ics.forth.gr> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> Στις 2021-09-27 23:13, Atish Patra έγραψε:
> > >>>>> We need to decide whether we should support the upstream kernel for
> > >>>>> D1. Few things to consider.
> > >>>>> – Can it be considered as an errata ?
> > >>>
> > >>> It's one thing to follow the spec and have an error in the
> > >>> implementation, and another to not follow the spec.
> > >>>
> > >>>>> – Does it set a bad precedent and open can of worms in future ?
> > >>>
> > >>> IMHO yes, I'm thinking of Kendryte 210 devs for example coming up and
> > >>> asking for MMU support, they 've also shipped many chips already. I can
> > >>> also imagine other vendors in the future coming up with implementations
> > >>> that violate the spec in which case handling the standard stuff will
> > >>> become messy and complex, and hurt performance/security. We'll end up
> > >>> filling the code with exceptions and tweaks all over the place. We need
> > >>> to be strict about what is "riscv" and what's "draft riscv" or "riscv
> > >>> inspired", and what we are willing to support upstream. I can understand
> > >>> supporting vendor extensions upstream but they need to fit within the
> > >>> standard spec, we can't have for example extensions that use encoding
> > >>> space/csrs/fields etc reserved for standard use, they may only use
> > >>> what's reserved for custom/vendor use. At least let's agree on that.
> > >>
> > >> Totally agree with Nick here. It's a slippery slope.
> > >>
> > >> Including D1 PTE bits (or Kendryte K210 MMU) part of the Linux RISC-V
> > >> means future hardware which intentionally violates specs will also have to
> > >> be merged and the RISC-V patch acceptance policy will have no significance.
> > >>
> > >>>
> > >>>>> – Can we just ignore D1 given the mass volume ?
> > >>>>>
> > >>>
> > >>> IMHO no, we need to find a way to support it upstream but I believe
> > >>> there is another question to answer:
> > >>>
> > >>> Do we also guarantee "one image to rule them all" approach, required by
> > >>> binary distros, for implementations that violate the spec ? Are we ok
> > >>> for example to support Allwinner D1 upstream but require a custom
> > >>> configuration/build instead of supporting it with the "generic" image ?
> > >>> In one case we need to handle the violation at runtime and introduce
> > >>> overhead for everyone (like looking up __riscv_svpbmt every time we set
> > >>> a PTE in this case), in the other it's an #ifdef.
> > >>
> > >> At least, we should not have hardware violating specs as part of the
> > >> unified kernel image instead have these intentional deviations/violations
> > >> under separate kconfig which will not be enabled by default. This means
> > >> vendors (of such hardware) and distros will have to explicitly enable
> > >> support for such violations/deviations.
> > >>
> > >
> > > If we merge the code and are not enabled by default, it would be a
> > > maintenance nightmare in future.
> > > These part of the kernel will not be regularly tested but we have to
> > > carry the changes for a long time.
> >
> > I don't see a difference between having these features as part of the
> > generic image vs having them as custom configs/builds. The code will get
> > executed only on boards that support the custom/non-compliant
> > implementation anyway. To the contrary we'll have more code to test if
> > we are doing things at runtime vs at compile time.
> >
> > > Similar changes will only grow over time causing a lot of custom
> > > configs that are not enabled by default.
> > >
> >
> > We'll have a lot of custom configs that will only get used on boards
> > that use them, vs runtime code that will run for no reason on every
> > board and choose the default/standard-compliant implementation most of
> > the time. In the end the code will only get tested on specific hardware
> > anyway.
> >
> > > IMHO, if we want to support this board in upstream, we should just
> > > clearly state that it is one time special exception
> > > for this board only because of the following reasons
> > >
> > > 1. The board design predates the patch acceptance policy.
> > > 2. We don't have enough affordable Linux compatible platforms today.
> > > 3. Allowing running an upstream kernel on D1 helps the RISC-V software
> > > ecosystem to grow.
> > >
> >
> > The same can be said for Kendryte as well, are we willing to also
> > support their MMU implementation on the generic image if a patch comes
> > in? To be clear I'm not saying we shouldn't support D1 or Kendryte
> > upstream, I'm just saying that we shouldn't sacrifice the complexity and
> > performance of the code path for standard-compliant implementations, to
> > support non-compliant implementations, and instead support non-compliant
> > implementations with custom kernel builds using compile time options. It
>
> For priming the pump on the software effort, having a solution that is enabled
> on distro-builds is clearly preferable — that leads to the solution that Palmer
> had outlined at LPC, which is to have a KCONFIG option that enables the
> alternate code paths and can be turned off for embedded use-cases.
>
> > still counts as upstream support, they won't have to maintain their own
> > forks. It'll also allow custom implementations to have more flexibility
> > on what they can do since they will be able to use completely
> > different/custom code paths, instead of trying to fit in the standard
> > code path (which will become a mess over time). I think this approach is
> > much more flexible and will allow more customizations to be supported
> > upstream in the future.
>
> The important detail will be the ground rules: changes have to be sufficiently
> quarantined that (a) they can be turned off, (b) can be reverted easily (in case
> that vendors fail to perform their maintenance obligations),

Can we really remove support once it is in and widely used?

> and (c) they don't
> affect the performance and complexity of the standard code paths.
>
> Cheers,
> Philipp.
>
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