[PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users

David Hildenbrand david at redhat.com
Tue May 18 03:27:13 PDT 2021

On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt at linux.ibm.com>
>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
> Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on
> mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common
> applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to
> inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers).
> Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally
> inhibit hibernate?

It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the 
admin to even work.


David / dhildenb

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