[PATCH v18 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas

Mike Rapoport rppt at kernel.org
Mon May 10 19:02:21 BST 2021

On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 11:47:47AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Thu, 2021-05-06 at 10:33 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Thu, May 06, 2021 at 08:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > What's happening with O_CLOEXEC in this code? I don't see that
> > mentioned in the cover letter either. Why is it disallowed? That
> > seems a strange limitation for something trying to avoid leaking
> > secrets into other processes.
> I actually thought we forced it, so I'll let Mike address this.  I
> think allowing it is great, so the secret memory isn't inherited by
> children, but I can see use cases where a process would want its child
> to inherit the secrets.

We do not enforce O_CLOEXEC, but if the user explicitly requested O_CLOEXEC
it would be passed to get_unused_fd_flags().

Sincerely yours,

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