[PATCH v16 09/11] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users

[Mike Rapoport]

From: Mike Rapoport <rppt at linux.ibm.com>

It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation snapshot
as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially will defeat
the purpose of secret memory mappings.

Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt at linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro at zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto at kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd at arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp at alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl at linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams at intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david at redhat.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova at intel.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen at jauu.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa at zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo at redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb at linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill at shutemov.name>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland at arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy at infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages at gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer at dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt at google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley at sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz at infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe at intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro at fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb at google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah at kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx at linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho at tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will at kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/secretmem.h |  6 ++++++
 kernel/power/hibernate.c  |  5 ++++-
 mm/secretmem.c            | 15 +++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/secretmem.h b/include/linux/secretmem.h
index 70e7db9f94fe..907a6734059c 100644
--- a/include/linux/secretmem.h
+++ b/include/linux/secretmem.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page);
+bool secretmem_active(void);
 
 #else
 
@@ -19,6 +20,11 @@ static inline bool page_is_secretmem(struct page *page)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECRETMEM */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_SECRETMEM_H */
diff --git a/kernel/power/hibernate.c b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
index da0b41914177..559acef3fddb 100644
--- a/kernel/power/hibernate.c
+++ b/kernel/power/hibernate.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/genhd.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/secretmem.h>
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 
 #include "power.h"
@@ -81,7 +82,9 @@ void hibernate_release(void)
 
 bool hibernation_available(void)
 {
-	return nohibernate == 0 && !security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION);
+	return nohibernate == 0 &&
+		!security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION) &&
+		!secretmem_active();
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
index 05026460e2ee..6ef32ad08184 100644
--- a/mm/secretmem.c
+++ b/mm/secretmem.c
@@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ struct secretmem_ctx {
 
 static struct cma *secretmem_cma;
 
+static atomic_t secretmem_users;
+
+bool secretmem_active(void)
+{
+	return !!atomic_read(&secretmem_users);
+}
+
 static int secretmem_account_pages(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp, int order)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -193,6 +200,12 @@ static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
 	.fault = secretmem_fault,
 };
 
+static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
@@ -215,6 +228,7 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
+	.release	= secretmem_release,
 	.mmap		= secretmem_mmap,
 };
 
@@ -330,6 +344,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned long, flags)
 	file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
 
 	fd_install(fd, file);
+	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
 	return fd;
 
 err_put_fd:
-- 
2.28.0