[PATCH v17 07/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
david at redhat.com
Tue Feb 16 12:16:36 EST 2021
>> For the other parts, the question is what we actually want to let
>> user space configure.
>> Being able to specify "Very secure" "maximum secure" "average
>> secure" all doesn't really make sense to me.
> Well, it doesn't to me either unless the user feels a cost/benefit, so
> if max cost $100 per invocation and average cost nothing, most people
> would chose average unless they had a very good reason not to. In your
> migratable model, if we had separate limits for non-migratable and
> migratable, with non-migratable being set low to prevent exhaustion,
> max secure becomes a highly scarce resource, whereas average secure is
> abundant then having the choice might make sense.
I hope that we can find a way to handle the migration part internally.
Especially, because Mike wants the default to be "as secure as
possible", so if there is a flag, it would have to be an opt-out flag.
I guess as long as we don't temporarily map it into the "owned" location
in the direct map shared by all VCPUs we are in a good positon. But this
needs more thought, of course.
>> The discussion regarding migratability only really popped up because
>> this is a user-visible thing and not being able to migrate can be a
>> real problem (fragmentation, ZONE_MOVABLE, ...).
> I think the biggest use will potentially come from hardware
> acceleration. If it becomes simple to add say encryption to a secret
> page with no cost, then no flag needed. However, if we only have a
> limited number of keys so once we run out no more encrypted memory then
> it becomes a costly resource and users might want a choice of being
> backed by encryption or not.
Right. But wouldn't HW support with configurable keys etc. need more
syscall parameters (meaning, even memefd_secret() as it is would not be
sufficient?). I suspect the simplistic flag approach might not be
sufficient. I might be wrong because I have no clue about MKTME and friends.
Anyhow, I still think extending memfd_create() might just be good enough
- at least for now. Things like HW support might have requirements we
don't even know yet and that we cannot even model in memfd_secret()
David / dhildenb
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