[PATCH v17 00/10] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
mhocko at suse.com
Tue Feb 9 03:59:31 EST 2021
On Mon 08-02-21 22:38:03, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > Am 08.02.2021 um 22:13 schrieb Mike Rapoport <rppt at kernel.org>:
> > On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 10:27:18AM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >> On 08.02.21 09:49, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> >> Some questions (and request to document the answers) as we now allow to have
> >> unmovable allocations all over the place and I don't see a single comment
> >> regarding that in the cover letter:
> >> 1. How will the issue of plenty of unmovable allocations for user space be
> >> tackled in the future?
> >> 2. How has this issue been documented? E.g., interaction with ZONE_MOVABLE
> >> and CMA, alloc_conig_range()/alloc_contig_pages?.
> > Secretmem sets the mappings gfp mask to GFP_HIGHUSER, so it does not
> > allocate movable pages at the first place.
> That is not the point. Secretmem cannot go on CMA / ZONE_MOVABLE
> memory and behaves like long-term pinnings in that sense. This is a
> real issue when using a lot of sectremem.
A lot of unevictable memory is a concern regardless of CMA/ZONE_MOVABLE.
As I've said it is quite easy to land at the similar situation even with
tmpfs/MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED on swapless system. Neither of the two is
really uncommon. It would be even worse that those would be allowed to
consume both CMA/ZONE_MOVABLE.
One has to be very careful when relying on CMA or movable zones. This is
definitely worth a comment in the kernel command line parameter
documentation. But this is not a new problem.
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