[PATCH v17 08/10] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users

David Hildenbrand david at redhat.com
Mon Feb 8 06:14:40 EST 2021

On 08.02.21 12:13, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 08.02.21 11:57, Michal Hocko wrote:
>> On Mon 08-02-21 11:53:58, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>> On 08.02.21 11:51, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>>> On Mon 08-02-21 11:32:11, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>>> On 08.02.21 11:18, Michal Hocko wrote:
>>>>>> On Mon 08-02-21 10:49:18, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>>>>>>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt at linux.ibm.com>
>>>>>>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>>>>>>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>>>>>>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>>>>>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
>>>>>> Does this feature need any special handling? As it is effectivelly
>>>>>> unevictable memory then it should behave the same as other mlock, ramfs
>>>>>> which should already disable hibernation as those cannot be swapped out,
>>>>>> no?
>>>>> Why should unevictable memory not go to swap when hibernating? We're merely
>>>>> dumping all of our system RAM (including any unmovable allocations) to swap
>>>>> storage and the system is essentially completely halted.
>>>> My understanding is that mlock is never really made visible via swap
>>>> storage.
>>> "Using swap storage for hibernation" and "swapping at runtime" are two
>>> different things. I might be wrong, though.
>> Well, mlock is certainly used to keep sensitive information, not only to
>> protect from major/minor faults.
> I think you're right in theory, the man page mentions "Cryptographic
> security software often handles critical bytes like passwords or secret
> keys as data structures" ...
> however, I am not aware of any such swap handling and wasn't able to
> spot it quickly. Let me take a closer look.



David / dhildenb

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