Landlock: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV bypass via io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD

Jens Axboe axboe at kernel.dk
Tue Jun 16 13:36:04 PDT 2026


On 6/16/26 2:16 PM, Bryam Vargas wrote:
> Hello Micka?l, and Landlock / io_uring folks,
> 
> A task confined by a Landlock ruleset that grants READ_FILE/WRITE_FILE
> on a block or NVMe character device but withholds
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV can still reach the device-command
> surface through io_uring IORING_OP_URING_CMD with the IOCTL_DEV check
> bypassed: the request enters the device-command handler (block
> discard, or the NVMe char-device passthrough) where the equivalent
> ioctl(2) is denied. The destructive completion and the NVMe-admin
> surface follow from the code -- see Impact.

I've said this before, but apparently it hasn't been received - this
isn't an io_uring issue. If landlock is missing a hook, then that's on
landlock and they should add it. Other security handlers already have
that. Hence no need to broadcast this to a bunch of lists, it's strictly
a landlock issue.

-- 
Jens Axboe



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