[PATCH 1/2] iouring: one capable call per iouring instance

[Keith Busch]

On Tue, Dec 05, 2023 at 12:14:22PM +0800, Ming Lei wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 04, 2023 at 11:57:55AM -0700, Keith Busch wrote:
> > On Mon, Dec 04, 2023 at 01:40:58PM -0500, Jeff Moyer wrote:
> > > I added a CC: linux-security-module at vger
> > > Keith Busch <kbusch at meta.com> writes:
> > > > From: Keith Busch <kbusch at kernel.org>
> > > >
> > > > The uring_cmd operation is often used for privileged actions, so drivers
> > > > subscribing to this interface check capable() for each command. The
> > > > capable() function is not fast path friendly for many kernel configs,
> > > > and this can really harm performance. Stash the capable sys admin
> > > > attribute in the io_uring context and set a new issue_flag for the
> > > > uring_cmd interface.
> > > 
> > > I have a few questions.  What privileged actions are performance
> > > sensitive? I would hope that anything requiring privileges would not
> > > be in a fast path (but clearly that's not the case).
> > 
> > Protocol specifics that don't have a generic equivalent. For example,
> > NVMe FDP is reachable only through the uring_cmd and ioctl interfaces,
> > but you use it like normal reads and writes so has to be as fast as the
> > generic interfaces.
> 
> But normal read/write pt command doesn't require ADMIN any more since 
> commit 855b7717f44b ("nvme: fine-granular CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nvme io commands"),
> why do you have to pay the cost of checking capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)?

Good question. The "capable" check had always been first so even with
the relaxed permissions, it was still paying the price. I have changed
that order in commit staged here (not yet upstream):

  http://git.infradead.org/nvme.git/commitdiff/7be866b1cf0bf1dfa74480fe8097daeceda68622

Note that only prevents the costly capable() check if the inexpensive
checks could make a determination. That's still not solving the problem
long term since we aim for forward compatibility where we have no idea
which opcodes, admin identifications, or vendor specifics could be
deemed "safe" for non-root users in the future, so those conditions
would always fall back to the more expensive check that this patch was
trying to mitigate for admin processes.