[PATCH 1/2] iouring: one capable call per iouring instance

[Jeff Moyer]

I added a CC: linux-security-module at vger

Hi, Keith,

Keith Busch <kbusch at meta.com> writes:

> From: Keith Busch <kbusch at kernel.org>
>
> The uring_cmd operation is often used for privileged actions, so drivers
> subscribing to this interface check capable() for each command. The
> capable() function is not fast path friendly for many kernel configs,
> and this can really harm performance. Stash the capable sys admin
> attribute in the io_uring context and set a new issue_flag for the
> uring_cmd interface.

I have a few questions.  What privileged actions are performance
sensitive?  I would hope that anything requiring privileges would not be
in a fast path (but clearly that's not the case).  What performance
benefits did you measure with this patch set in place (and on what
workloads)?  What happens when a ring fd is passed to another process?

Finally, as Jens mentioned, I would expect dropping priviliges to, you
know, drop privileges.  I don't think a commit message is going to be
enough documentation for a change like this.

Cheers,
Jeff

>
> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch at kernel.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/io_uring_types.h | 4 ++++
>  io_uring/io_uring.c            | 1 +
>  io_uring/uring_cmd.c           | 2 ++
>  3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
> index bebab36abce89..d64d6916753f0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
> +++ b/include/linux/io_uring_types.h
> @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ enum io_uring_cmd_flags {
>  	/* set when uring wants to cancel a previously issued command */
>  	IO_URING_F_CANCEL		= (1 << 11),
>  	IO_URING_F_COMPAT		= (1 << 12),
> +
> +	/* ring validated as CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable */
> +	IO_URING_F_SYS_ADMIN		= (1 << 13),
>  };
>  
>  struct io_wq_work_node {
> @@ -240,6 +243,7 @@ struct io_ring_ctx {
>  		unsigned int		poll_activated: 1;
>  		unsigned int		drain_disabled: 1;
>  		unsigned int		compat: 1;
> +		unsigned int		sys_admin: 1;
>  
>  		struct task_struct	*submitter_task;
>  		struct io_rings		*rings;
> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> index 1d254f2c997de..4aa10b64f539e 100644
> --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
> +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> @@ -3980,6 +3980,7 @@ static __cold int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p,
>  		ctx->syscall_iopoll = 1;
>  
>  	ctx->compat = in_compat_syscall();
> +	ctx->sys_admin = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>  	if (!ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK))
>  		ctx->user = get_uid(current_user());
>  
> diff --git a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
> index 8a38b9f75d841..764f0e004aa00 100644
> --- a/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
> +++ b/io_uring/uring_cmd.c
> @@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ int io_uring_cmd(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
>  		issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_CQE32;
>  	if (ctx->compat)
>  		issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_COMPAT;
> +	if (ctx->sys_admin)
> +		issue_flags |= IO_URING_F_SYS_ADMIN;
>  	if (ctx->flags & IORING_SETUP_IOPOLL) {
>  		if (!file->f_op->uring_cmd_iopoll)
>  			return -EOPNOTSUPP;