secure file deletion/SECRM support for JFFS2 and UBIFS

[Richard Weinberger]

Am 28.04.2016 um 10:40 schrieb Ricard Wanderlof:
> 
> On Thu, 28 Apr 2016, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> 
>> Am 28.04.2016 um 00:35 schrieb Chris Packham:
>>>> Well, UBIFS and JFFS2 work on generic MTD, so having a special hack for NOR
>>>> is not really what we want.
>>>
>>> Agreed. I was hoping there was a similar trick for NAND which I'm less 
>>> familiar with. The fallback behavior of an immediate erase is still 
>>> doable but it has more corner cases that we'd need to be weary of.
>>
>> Nope, on NAND you're forced to erase.
> 
> I know generally there is a recommendation not to overwrite bits already 
> set to 0 with 0 for NAND, but I can't remember if that is related to the 
> subsequent readability of surrounding data, or if may cause a future erase 
> not to perform properly, or actually physically damages the bit cell (or 
> there is some other reason).

I have been told that overwriting data on NAND can lead to physically damage,
but don't ask for a reference. ;-)
Maybe NAND fracturing folks can give more details on this topic.

Thanks,
//richard