[PATCH] XATTR issues on JFFS2

[Kaigai Kohei]

Hi,

>>In this plan, jffs2_inode_cahce and jffs2_xattr_datum will be defined as 
>>follows:
>>struct jffs2_inode_cache {
>>    struct jffs2_full_dirent *scan_dents;
>>    uint16_t class; /* =0 means jffs2_inode_cache */
>>    uint16_t state;
>>       :
>>
>>struct jffs2_xattr_datum {
>>    void *dummy;    /* always NULL */
>>    uint16_t class; /* =1 means jffs2_xattr_datum */
>>       :
> 
> 
> You could even make the class a u8.  For inodes, the remaining 8 bits
> would just be reserved space for proper alignment.  If either of your
> xattr object could make use of the extra byte, it would be worth it.
> If not, just ignore my silly idea.

u8 type variable has enough width for discernment, I think.

And, is it possible to name the remaining 8-bit 'flags' than
'reserved' or 'unused' in jffs2_inode_cache/jffs2_xattr_datum ?

In my implementation, 'uint8_t ilist_checked' is added in
jffs2_inode_cache for flag purpose, and 'uint16_t flags' exists
in jffs2_xattr_datum(jffs2_xattr_cache in old name).
If we can stuff those into the remaining 8-bit, each object size
will be reduced by 4-byte, I think.


>>I see, jffs2_scan_eraseblock() is indeed a bit long.
>>Please send your attempt patches at first.
>>I'll try to cleanup it for the basis of XATTR patch.
> 
> 
> It was 34 patches going over all of jffs2, actually.  I guess it's
> easier to send the changed scan.c.  The pseudo-random stuff was
> controversial, so I lost interest after a while.

'34 patches over all of jffs2' is over my expectation, orz.
I prefer to pay attention on only the changed scan.c, if possible...
Please send it to me,


>>>This is just wrong.  I agree that something inside the kernel must
>>>know whether users need specific capabilities to read/write the xattr.
>>>Sure.  But why in hell does it have to be JFFS2?
>>>
>>>How do other filesystems deal with this?  ext[23] and reiserfs (v3)
>>>all have xattr, I believe.
>>
>>Indeed, more upper layer might be able to manage this kind of decision
>>making as you say. But it's transferred to the filesystem currently.
>>All of them (ext2/3, reiser and so on) have own permission checking codes
>>like 'fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c', and I imitated those implementations.
>>I don't know the reason correctly.
> 
> 
> The code is not exactly easy to follow.  But it appears as if they
> used that stuff for compression.  If prefix is "trusted.", just use an
> e_name_index of 4 and drop the prefix.  It can be reconstructed on
> reads.

Hmm, it's functionality certainly effective for reduction of
memory and medium usage. It's not difficult to implement, I think.
I'll modify the method of storing xattr in next.

Thanks,
-- 
Linux Promotion Center, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai at ak.jp.nec.com>