[PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening

[Linu Cherian]

Kindly please ignore this, sent the reply again by mistake.

On Tue, Sep 01, 2026 at 08:32:13PM +0530, Linu Cherian wrote:
> Hi Kevin,
> 
> On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 03:08:42PM +0100, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> > [Sending during the merge window in case reviewers have spare
> > cycles; I'm not aiming to have this series merged in v7.3.]
> > 
> > This is a proposal to leverage protection keys (pkeys) to harden
> > critical kernel data, by making it mostly read-only. The series includes
> > a simple framework called "kpkeys" to manipulate pkeys for in-kernel use,
> > as well as a page table hardening feature based on that framework,
> > "kpkeys_hardened_pgtables". Both are implemented on arm64 as a proof of
> > concept, but they are designed to be compatible with any architecture
> > that supports pkeys.
> > 
> > The proposed approach is a typical use of pkeys: the data to protect is
> > mapped with a given pkey P, and the pkey register is initially
> > configured to grant read-only access to P. Where the protected data
> > needs to be written to, the pkey register is temporarily switched to
> > grant write access to P on the current CPU.
> > 
> > The key fact this approach relies on is that the target data is
> > only written to via a limited and well-defined API. This makes it
> > possible to explicitly switch the pkey register where needed, without
> > introducing excessively invasive changes, and only for a small amount of
> > trusted code.
> > 
> > Page tables are chosen as an initial target because of their especially
> > critical nature - a single write may result in arbitrary pages becoming
> > accessible to any context (including userspace). In order to keep the
> > series digestible for reviewers, this version focuses on functionality
> > rather than performance, making it most suitable as a debug feature. The
> > key trade-off is the requirement to PTE-map the linear map - see section
> > "Protected page table allocation" for details.
> > 
> > This series has similarities with the "PKS write protected page tables"
> > series posted by Rick Edgecombe a few years ago [1] but it is not
> > specific to x86/PKS - the approach is meant to be generic.
> > 
> > This proposal (as of RFC v5) was presented at Linux Security Summit
> > Europe 2025 [2].
> > 
> > [Table of contents]
> > 
> > * kpkeys
> >   - pkey register management
> > 
> > * kpkeys_hardened_pgtables
> >   - Protected page table allocation
> >   - kpkeys context switching
> >   - Performance
> >   - Limitations
> > 
> > * This series
> >   - Branches
> > 
> > * Threat model
> > 
> > * Further use-cases
> > 
> > * Open questions
> > 
> > kpkeys
> > ======
> > 
> > The use of pkeys involves two separate mechanisms: assigning a pkey to
> > pages, and defining the pkeys -> permissions mapping via the pkey
> > register. This is implemented through the following interface:
> > 
> > - Pages are assigned a pkey in the linear map using set_memory_pkey().
> >   This is sufficient for this series, but it is also plausible for
> >   higher-level allocators to support marking allocations with a given
> >   pkey.
> > 
> > - The pkey register is configured based on a *kpkeys context*. kpkeys
> >   contexts are represented as simple integers that correspond to a given
> >   configuration, for instance:
> > 
> >   KPKEYS_CTX_DEFAULT:
> >         RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT
> >         RO access to any other KPKEYS_PKEY_*
> > 
> >   KPKEYS_CTX_<FEAT>:
> >         RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT
> >         RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_<FEAT>
> >         RO access to any other KPKEYS_PKEY_*
> > 
> >   Only pkeys that are managed by the kpkeys framework are impacted;
> >   permissions for other pkeys are left unchanged (this allows for other
> >   schemes using pkeys to be used in parallel, and arch-specific use of
> >   certain pkeys).
> 
> - Adding some basic details on what a scheme and context is quite helpful.
> 
> - Giving some hints (may be an example) on how multiple schemes and multiple contexts
>   play together would be quite helpful.
> 
> May be adding a documentation covering these aspects would be helpful as
> well.
> 
> My understanding is that pkeys are being partitioned across different
> contexts. But then the introduction of the term "scheme" looks bit confusing to me.
> 
> > 
> >   The current kpkeys context is changed by calling
> >   kpkeys_enter_context(), which will set the pkey register
> >   accordingly and return the original state. A
> 
> ..snip
> 
> > Open questions
> > ==============
> > 
> > A few aspects in this RFC that are debatable and/or worth discussing:
> > 
> > - There is currently no restriction on how kpkeys contexts map to pkeys
> >   permissions. A typical approach is to allocate one pkey per context and
> >   make it writable in that context only. As the number of contexts
> 
> Probably to avoid the assumption, may be we can we have something like
> below
> 
> For a pkey P, we could define
> PKEY_P_PERM_CTXT_OTHERS  //permission for pkey p in other contexts
> PKEY_P_PERM_CTXT_SELF    //permission for pkey p in self context
> 
> With the assumption of one pkey mapped for every context,
> the permission for the default context would look something like,
> 
> PKEY_DEF_PERM_CTXT_SELF << PKEY_DEF_PKEY_SHIFT |
> PKEY_CT0_PERM_CTXT_OTHERS << PKEY_CT0_PKEY_SHIFT |
> PKEY_CT1_PERM_CTXT_OTHERS << PKEY_CT1_PKEY_SHIFT |
> ...(for all valid contexts)
> 
> where,
> Permission key, PKEY_DEF is associated with context DEFAULT,
> Permission key, PKEY_CT0 is associated with context CT0,
> Permission key, PKEY_CT1 is associated with context CT1
> 
> 
> >   increases, we may however run out of pkeys, especially on arm64 (just
> >   8 pkeys with POE). Depending on the use-cases, it may be acceptable to
> >   use the same pkey for the data associated to multiple contexts.
> > 
> 
> Lets say two contexts A and B, use the same pkey P as their permission matches.
> But then, when we enter context A, permission for pkey P gets
> relaxed, then that would relax permission for pages associated with
> context B as well which is unintended ?
> 
> As the hardware supports 16 pkeys, should we consider removing the limit
> of 8 pkeys so that we can have unique pkeys for each context ?
> 
> --
> Linu Cherian
>