[PATCH 4/5] lib/crypto: poly1305: Take a size_t length in poly1305_update()
Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay
devnull+vladimir.genproof.com at kernel.org
Mon Oct 12 14:31:21 PDT 2026
From: Vladimir Kukharenko <vladimir at genproof.com>
poly1305_update() adds desc->buflen and nbytes as unsigned int values
to check for a full block. With 1 to 15 bytes in the buffer and
nbytes >= 2^32 - desc->buflen, the sum wraps. The tail path then copies
nbytes bytes into the 16-byte desc->buf.
For example, these calls trigger the bug:
poly1305_update(&desc, p, 1);
poly1305_update(&desc, p + 1, 0xffffffff);
Commit b646b782e522 ("lib/crypto: poly1305: Consolidate into single
module") introduced this addition. The previous BLOCK_HASH_UPDATE()
code used size_t for the addition.
The unsigned int nbytes parameter also truncates the size_t lengths
from lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c. For associated data or messages of
4 GiB or more, poly1305_update() authenticates only the first
(length mod 2^32) bytes. Other hash-like library functions, including
sha256_update() and blake2s_update(), take size_t lengths.
Change nbytes to size_t and compare it with the space left in the
buffer. poly1305_blocks() takes an unsigned int length, so pass it at
most UINT_MAX bytes per call, rounded down to a whole number of blocks.
On 64-bit MIPS and RISC-V, this relies on the preceding patches, which
make their assembly handle lengths of 2 GiB or more.
No in-tree caller passes inputs this large, so this is an ABI robustness
improvement. I found the bugs while writing a Coq/VST proof of this
code with LLM agents. I reproduced the overflow in userspace with
AddressSanitizer, and the truncation by comparing MACs with OpenSSL.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Kukharenko <vladimir at genproof.com>
---
include/crypto/poly1305.h | 2 +-
lib/crypto/poly1305.c | 14 +++++++-------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/crypto/poly1305.h b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
index 190beb427c6d..bf53b1df9aa3 100644
--- a/include/crypto/poly1305.h
+++ b/include/crypto/poly1305.h
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ struct poly1305_desc_ctx {
void poly1305_init(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
const u8 key[at_least POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]);
void poly1305_update(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int nbytes);
+ const u8 *src, size_t nbytes);
void poly1305_final(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc, u8 *digest);
#endif
diff --git a/lib/crypto/poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
index f313ccc4b4dd..f04c4cc2f55c 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/poly1305.c
@@ -35,11 +35,9 @@ void poly1305_init(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(poly1305_init);
void poly1305_update(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
- const u8 *src, unsigned int nbytes)
+ const u8 *src, size_t nbytes)
{
- if (desc->buflen + nbytes >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- unsigned int bulk_len;
-
+ if (nbytes >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - desc->buflen) {
if (desc->buflen) {
unsigned int l = POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE - desc->buflen;
@@ -52,12 +50,14 @@ void poly1305_update(struct poly1305_desc_ctx *desc,
desc->buflen = 0;
}
- bulk_len = round_down(nbytes, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
- nbytes %= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ while (nbytes >= POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* poly1305_blocks() takes an unsigned int length. */
+ unsigned int bulk_len = round_down(min(nbytes, UINT_MAX),
+ POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (bulk_len) {
poly1305_blocks(&desc->state, src, bulk_len, 1);
src += bulk_len;
+ nbytes -= bulk_len;
}
}
if (nbytes) {
--
2.43.0
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