Patch "drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free" has been added to the 6.6-stable tree
gregkh at linuxfoundation.org
gregkh at linuxfoundation.org
Thu Mar 19 05:01:24 PDT 2026
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free
to the 6.6-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
drm-exynos-vidi-use-ctx-lock-to-protect-struct-vidi_context-member-variables-related-to-memory-alloc-free.patch
and it can be found in the queue-6.6 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable at vger.kernel.org> know about it.
>From stable+bounces-219911-greg=kroah.com at vger.kernel.org Fri Feb 27 06:01:30 2026
From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510 at gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2026 13:59:53 +0900
Subject: drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free
To: stable at vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>, Inki Dae <inki.dae at samsung.com>, Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim at samsung.com>, Kyungmin Park <kyungmin.park at samsung.com>, David Airlie <airlied at gmail.com>, Simona Vetter <simona at ffwll.ch>, Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk at kernel.org>, Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar at samsung.com>, dri-devel at lists.freedesktop.org, linux-arm-kernel at lists.infradead.org, linux-samsung-soc at vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel at vger.kernel.org, Jeongjun Park <aha310510 at gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20260227045953.165751-4-aha310510 at gmail.com>
From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510 at gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 52b330799e2d6f825ae2bb74662ec1b10eb954bb ]
Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations
without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem.
For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this:
```
CPU0 CPU1 CPU2
---- ---- ----
vidi_connection_ioctl()
if (vidi->connection) // true
drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid
...
ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid;
...
drm_mode_getconnector()
drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes()
vidi_get_modes()
if (ctx->raw_edid) // true
drm_edid_dup(ctx->raw_edid);
if (!drm_edid) // false
...
vidi_connection_ioctl()
if (vidi->connection) // false
drm_edid_free(ctx->raw_edid); // free drm_edid
...
drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid->edid)
kmemdup(edid); // UAF!!
...
```
To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related
to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx->lock.
Cc: <stable at vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510 at gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh at linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c
@@ -186,15 +186,17 @@ static ssize_t vidi_store_connection(str
const char *buf, size_t len)
{
struct vidi_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- int ret;
+ int ret, new_connected;
- ret = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &ctx->connected);
+ ret = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &new_connected);
if (ret)
return ret;
- if (ctx->connected > 1)
+ if (new_connected > 1)
return -EINVAL;
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
+
/* use fake edid data for test. */
if (!ctx->raw_edid)
ctx->raw_edid = (struct edid *)fake_edid_info;
@@ -202,14 +204,21 @@ static ssize_t vidi_store_connection(str
/* if raw_edid isn't same as fake data then it can't be tested. */
if (ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) {
DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(dev, "edid data is not fake data.\n");
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto fail;
}
+ ctx->connected = new_connected;
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(dev, "requested connection.\n");
drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(ctx->drm_dev);
return len;
+fail:
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+ return ret;
}
static DEVICE_ATTR(connection, 0644, vidi_show_connection,
@@ -244,11 +253,14 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev
return -EINVAL;
}
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
if (ctx->connected == vidi->connection) {
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev,
"same connection request.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
if (vidi->connection) {
struct edid *raw_edid;
@@ -271,20 +283,27 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev
"failed to allocate raw_edid.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
ctx->raw_edid = raw_edid;
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
} else {
/*
* with connection = 0, free raw_edid
* only if raw edid data isn't same as fake data.
*/
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
if (ctx->raw_edid && ctx->raw_edid !=
(struct edid *)fake_edid_info) {
kfree(ctx->raw_edid);
ctx->raw_edid = NULL;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
}
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
ctx->connected = vidi->connection;
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(ctx->drm_dev);
return 0;
@@ -299,7 +318,7 @@ static enum drm_connector_status vidi_de
* connection request would come from user side
* to do hotplug through specific ioctl.
*/
- return ctx->connected ? connector_status_connected :
+ return READ_ONCE(ctx->connected) ? connector_status_connected :
connector_status_disconnected;
}
@@ -321,22 +340,24 @@ static int vidi_get_modes(struct drm_con
struct vidi_context *ctx = ctx_from_connector(connector);
struct edid *edid;
int edid_len;
- int count;
+ int count = 0;
/*
* the edid data comes from user side and it would be set
* to ctx->raw_edid through specific ioctl.
*/
+
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
if (!ctx->raw_edid) {
DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "raw_edid is null.\n");
- return 0;
+ goto fail;
}
edid_len = (1 + ctx->raw_edid->extensions) * EDID_LENGTH;
edid = kmemdup(ctx->raw_edid, edid_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!edid) {
DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "failed to allocate edid\n");
- return 0;
+ goto fail;
}
drm_connector_update_edid_property(connector, edid);
@@ -345,6 +366,8 @@ static int vidi_get_modes(struct drm_con
kfree(edid);
+fail:
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
return count;
}
@@ -490,11 +513,15 @@ static int vidi_remove(struct platform_d
{
struct vidi_context *ctx = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+ mutex_lock(&ctx->lock);
+
if (ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) {
kfree(ctx->raw_edid);
ctx->raw_edid = NULL;
}
+ mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock);
+
component_del(&pdev->dev, &vidi_component_ops);
return 0;
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from aha310510 at gmail.com are
queue-6.6/drm-exynos-vidi-use-ctx-lock-to-protect-struct-vidi_context-member-variables-related-to-memory-alloc-free.patch
queue-6.6/drm-exynos-vidi-use-priv-vidi_dev-for-ctx-lookup-in-vidi_connection_ioctl.patch
queue-6.6/drm-exynos-vidi-fix-to-avoid-directly-dereferencing-user-pointer.patch
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