[PATCH RFC bpf-next 2/8] bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack

[Alexis Lothoré]

On Sat Apr 25, 2026 at 1:18 AM CEST, Ihor Solodrai wrote:
> On 4/13/26 11:28 AM, Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) wrote:
>> In order to prepare to emit KASAN checks in JITed programs, JIT
>> compilers need to be aware about whether some load/store instructions
>> are targeting the bpf program stack, as those should not be monitored
>> (we already have guard pages for that, and it is difficult anyway to
>> correctly monitor any kind of data passed on stack).
>> 
>> To support this need, make the BPF verifier mark the instructions that
>> access program stack:
>> - add a setter that allows the verifier to mark instructions accessing
>>   the program stack
>> - add a getter that allows JIT compilers to check whether instructions
>>   being JITed are accessing the stack
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore at bootlin.com>
>> ---
>>  include/linux/bpf.h          |  2 ++
>>  include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  2 ++
>>  kernel/bpf/core.c            | 10 ++++++++++
>>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c        |  7 +++++++
>>  4 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> index b4b703c90ca9..774a0395c498 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> @@ -1543,6 +1543,8 @@ void bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(u32 size);
>>  bool bpf_prog_has_trampoline(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
>>  bool bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_prog *prog,
>>  				 int insn_idx);
>> +bool bpf_insn_accesses_stack(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>> +			     const struct bpf_prog *prog, int insn_idx);
>>  #else
>>  static inline int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link,
>>  					   struct bpf_trampoline *tr,
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>> index b148f816f25b..ab99ed4c4227 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>> @@ -660,6 +660,8 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
>>  	u16 const_reg_map_mask;
>>  	u16 const_reg_subprog_mask;
>>  	u32 const_reg_vals[10];
>> +	/* instruction accesses stack */
>> +	bool accesses_stack;
>>  };
>>  
>>  #define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> index 8b018ff48875..340abfdadbed 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -1582,6 +1582,16 @@ bool bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struc
>>  	insn_idx += prog->aux->subprog_start;
>>  	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].indirect_target;
>>  }
>> +
>> +bool bpf_insn_accesses_stack(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>> +			     const struct bpf_prog *prog, int insn_idx)
>> +{
>> +	if (!env)
>> +		return false;
>> +	insn_idx += prog->aux->subprog_start;
>> +	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].accesses_stack;
>> +}
>> +
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */
>>  
>>  /* Base function for offset calculation. Needs to go into .text section,
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index 1e36b9e91277..7bce4fb4e540 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -3502,6 +3502,11 @@ static void mark_indirect_target(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
>>  	env->insn_aux_data[idx].indirect_target = true;
>>  }
>>  
>> +static void mark_insn_accesses_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
>> +{
>> +	env->insn_aux_data[idx].accesses_stack = true;
>> +}
>> +
>>  #define LR_FRAMENO_BITS	3
>>  #define LR_SPI_BITS	6
>>  #define LR_ENTRY_BITS	(LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1)
>> @@ -6490,6 +6495,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
>>  		else
>>  			err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
>>  						value_regno, insn_idx);
>> +
>> +		mark_insn_accesses_stack(env, insn_idx);
>
> I am not sure this can be done unconditionally here.
>
> It may be possible in different states to have different pointer
> types for the affected reg (PTR_TO_STACK in one execution path and say
> PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE in another). And if set uncoditionally,
> instrumentation may be skipped for legitimate targets.
>
> Maybe reset by default in check_mem_access()?

Hmm, ok, thanks, I missed this subtlety. I still need to dig in there to
make sure to really understand how the verifier handles those states,
but if I understand correctly your point, I guess that just resetting
the "accesses stack" flag at the entry of check_mem_access is not
enough: it would make the final result depend on the order of the states
being checked, eg:
- first state being checked result in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, no flag set
- second (and final) state being checked result in PTR_TO_STACK, flag is
  now set
- if no other state: insn ends up being (wrongly) marked to be ignored 

So unless I am misunderstanding things here, the question rather becomes
"for this specific insn, is there any state in which the accessed memory
is anything else other than PTR_TO_STACK". The flag could just be
inverted (ie set to true by default), and reset by any state resulting
in something other than PTR_TO_STACK.

Alexis
-- 
Alexis Lothoré, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com