[PATCH] KVM: arm64: Validate the FF-A memory access descriptor placement

[Sudeep Holla]

On Thu, Apr 23, 2026 at 09:17:49AM +0000, Sebastian Ene wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 22, 2026 at 08:29:06PM +0100, Sudeep Holla wrote:

[...]

> Hello Sudeep,
> 
> > That's just the current choice in the driver and can be changed in the future.
> > 
> > > and makes use of the same assumption in: ffa_mem_desc_offset().
> > > https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0/source/include/linux/arm_ffa.h#L448
> > 
> > Again this is just in the transmit path of the message the driver is
> > constructing and hence it is a simple choice rather than wrong assumption.
> >
> > > The later one seems wrong IMO. because we should compute the offset
> > > based on the value stored in ep_mem_offset and not adding it up with
> > > sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region).
> > > 
> > 
> > Sorry what am I missing as the driver is building these descriptors to
> > send it across to SPMC, we are populating the field and it will be 0
> > before it is initialised
> 
> Right, what I meant is having something like this since this function is not limited
> to the driver scope and using it from other components would imply relying on the
> assumption: 'ep_mem_offset == sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region)'. We will also have to validate
> that the `ep_mem_offset` doesn't point outside of the mailbox designated buffer.
> 

Sure, we can extend the function itself or add addition helper to get the
functionality you are looking for the validation.

> ---
> diff --git a/include/linux/arm_ffa.h b/include/linux/arm_ffa.h
> index 81e603839c4a..62d67dae8b70 100644
> --- a/include/linux/arm_ffa.h
> +++ b/include/linux/arm_ffa.h
> @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ ffa_mem_desc_offset(struct ffa_mem_region *buf, int count, u32 ffa_version)
>         if (!FFA_MEM_REGION_HAS_EP_MEM_OFFSET(ffa_version))
>                 offset += offsetof(struct ffa_mem_region, ep_mem_offset);
>         else
> -               offset += sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region);
> +               offset += buf->ep_mem_offset;
>
>         return offset;
>  }
> ---
> 
> And then move `ffa_mem_region_additional_setup` to be called earlier before `ffa_mem_desc_offset`:
> (so that it can setup the value for ep_mem_offset)
> 
> ---
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c
> index f2f94d4d533e..66de59c88aff 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c
> @@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize,
>         mem_region->flags = args->flags;
>         mem_region->sender_id = drv_info->vm_id;
>         mem_region->attributes = ffa_memory_attributes_get(func_id);
> +
> +       ffa_mem_region_additional_setup(drv_info->version, mem_region);

Ah this could do the trick. I need to check if all the usages are covered
though.

>         composite_offset = ffa_mem_desc_offset(buffer, args->nattrs,
>                                                drv_info->version);
>  
> @@ -708,7 +710,6 @@ ffa_setup_and_transmit(u32 func_id, void *buffer, u32 max_fragsize,
>         }
>         mem_region->handle = 0;
>         mem_region->ep_count = args->nattrs;
> -       ffa_mem_region_additional_setup(drv_info->version, mem_region);
> ---
> 
> > 
> > > Maybe this should be the fix instead and not the one in pKVM ? What do
> > > you think ?
> > > 
> > 
> > Can you share the diff you have in mind to understand your concern better
> > or are you referring to this patch itself.
> 
> Sure, please let me know if you think this is wrong. I might have misunderstood it. 
> 

Nope, the patch helped to understand it quicker. Thanks for that.

> > 
> > > The current implementation in pKVM makes use of the
> > > ffa_mem_desc_offset() to validate the first EMAD. If a compromised host
> > > places an EMAD at a different offset than sizeof(struct ffa_mem_region),
> > > then pKVM will not validate that EMAD.
> > >
> > 
> > Calling the host as compromised if it chooses a different offset seems bit
> > of extreme here. I am no sure if I am missing to understand something here.
> > 
> 
> Sorry for not explaining it, in pKVM model we don't trust the host kernel so
> we can assume that everything that doesn't pass the hypervisor validation(in
> this case the ff-a memory transaction) can be a potential attack that wants
> to compromise EL2.
> 

I am aware of the principle in general, but this example with different offset
can't be assumed as comprised host if the offset + size is well within the
Tx buffer size boundaries. That should be the way for you to cross check for
any compromise IHMO.

-- 
Regards,
Sudeep