[PATCH hyperv-next v2 1/4] Documentation: hyperv: Confidential VMBus

[Roman Kisel]

On 5/11/2025 10:22 PM, ALOK TIWARI wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12-05-2025 04:37, Roman Kisel wrote:
>> Define what the confidential VMBus is and describe what advantages
>> it offers on the capable hardware.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank at linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>>   Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst b/Documentation/virt/ 
>> hyperv/vmbus.rst
>> index 1dcef6a7fda3..ca2b948e5070 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/vmbus.rst
>> @@ -324,3 +324,44 @@ rescinded, neither Hyper-V nor Linux retains any 
>> state about
>>   its previous existence. Such a device might be re-added later,
>>   in which case it is treated as an entirely new device. See
>>   vmbus_onoffer_rescind().
>> +
>> +Confidential VMBus
>> +------------------
>> +
> 
> The purpose and benefits of the Confidential VMBus are not clearly stated.
> for example:
> "Confidential VMBus provides a secure communication channel between 
> guest and paravisor, ensuring that sensitive data is protected from 
> hypervisor-level access through memory encryption and register state 
> isolation."
> 
>> +The confidential VMBus provides the control and data planes where
>> +the guest doesn't talk to either the hypervisor or the host. Instead,
>> +it relies on the trusted paravisor. The hardware (SNP or TDX) encrypts
>> +the guest memory and the register state also measuring the paravisor
> 
> s/alos/while and s/via using/using
> "register state while measuring the paravisor image using the platform 
> security"
> 
>> +image via using the platform security processor to ensure trusted and
>> +confidential computing.
>> +
>> +To support confidential communication with the paravisor, a VMBus client
>> +will first attempt to use regular, non-isolated mechanisms for 
>> communication.
>> +To do this, it must:
>> +
>> +* Configure the paravisor SIMP with an encrypted page. The paravisor 
>> SIMP is
>> +  configured by setting the relevant MSR directly, without using GHCB 
>> or tdcall.
>> +
>> +* Enable SINT 2 on both the paravisor and hypervisor, without setting 
>> the proxy
>> +  flag on the paravisor SINT. Enable interrupts on the paravisor SynIC.
>> +
>> +* Configure both the paravisor and hypervisor event flags page.
>> +  Both pages will need to be scanned when VMBus receives a channel 
>> interrupt.
>> +
>> +* Send messages to the paravisor by calling HvPostMessage directly, 
>> without using
>> +  GHCB or tdcall.
>> +
>> +* Set the EOM MSR directly in the paravisor, without using GHCB or 
>> tdcall.
>> +
>> +If sending the InitiateContact message using non-isolated 
>> HvPostMessage fails,
>> +the client must fall back to using the hypervisor synic, by using the 
>> GHCB/tdcall
>> +as appropriate.
>> +
>> +To fall back, the client will have to reconfigure the following:
>> +
>> +* Configure the hypervisor SIMP with a host-visible page.
>> +  Since the hypervisor SIMP is not used when in confidential mode,
>> +  this can be done up front, or only when needed, whichever makes 
>> sense for
>> +  the particular implementation.
> 
> "SIMP is not used in confidential mode,
> this can be done either upfront or only when needed, depending on the 
> specific implementation."
> 
>> +
>> +* Set the proxy flag on SINT 2 for the paravisor.
> 

Alok, thanks for you continued interest and support! I'll incorporate
your suggestions in the next version of the patchset, great points!

> 
> Thanks,
> Alok
> 

-- 
Thank you,
Roman