[PATCH v1 0/5] KVM: arm64: Enforce MTE disablement at EL2

[Will Deacon]

On Tue, Dec 02, 2025 at 02:43:36PM -0800, Oliver Upton wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 27, 2025 at 12:22:05PM +0000, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > pKVM never exposes MTE to protected guests (pVM), but we must also
> > ensure a malicious host cannot use MTE to attack the hypervisor or a
> > pVM.
> > 
> > If MTE is supported by the hardware (and is enabled at EL3), it remains
> > available to lower exception levels by default. Disabling it in the host
> > kernel (e.g., via 'arm64.nomte') only stops the kernel from advertising
> > the feature; it does not physically disable MTE in the hardware.
> > 
> > In this scenario, a malicious host could still access tags in pages
> > donated to a guest using MTE instructions (e.g., STG and LDG), bypassing
> > the kernel's configuration.
> > 
> > To prevent this, explicitly disable MTE at EL2 (by clearing HCR_EL2.ATA)
> > when the host has MTE disabled. This causes any MTE instruction usage to
> > generate a Data Abort (trap) to the hypervisor.
> > 
> > Additionally, to faithfully mimic hardware that does not support MTE,
> > trap accesses to MTE system registers (e.g., GCR_EL1) and inject an
> > Undefined Instruction exception back to the host.
> > 
> > This logic is applied in all non-VHE modes. For non-protected modes,
> > this remains beneficial as it prevents unpredictable behavior caused by
> > accessing allocation tags when the system considers them disabled.
> > 
> > Note that this ties into my other outgoing patch series [1], which also
> > has some MTE-related fixes, but is not dependent on it.
> 
> To be honest, I've actually been having a bit of a hard time
> rationalizing some of these targeted fixes for pKVM. It has been in a
> half working state upstream for O(years) and we haven't made forward
> progress on enabling pVMs.
> 
> Fully aware that guest_memfd has been one of the long poles here, but
> I'm becoming less interested in fixes addressing "pKVM policy is XYZ"
> without having the full picture of the feature.

That's completely understandable and we're similarly frustrated.

> What are the upstream plans on enabling some basic implementation of
> protected VMs?

Funnily enough, I've been hacking on this recently and I've ended up
with something that I think serves as a good basis for enabling pvms
incrementally upstream. I need to clean the patches up but I'll be
flying to Japan and back next week so that gives me a good opportunity
to do exactly that!

In the meantime, I hope you'll still consider fixes for non-protected
guests under pKVM (e.g. [1]), as that is an area where I think we've
made some reasonable progress.

Will

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251128141710.19472-1-will@kernel.org/