[PATCH v17 00/24] KVM: Enable mmap() for guest_memfd

[Sean Christopherson]

On Wed, Aug 27, 2025, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 7/30/25 00:54, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Paolo,
> > 
> > The arm64 patches have been Reviewed-by Marc, and AFAICT the x86 side of
> > things is a go.  Barring a screwup on my end, this just needs your approval.
> > 
> > Assuming everything looks good, it'd be helpful to get this into kvm/next
> > shortly after rc1.  The x86 Kconfig changes in particular create semantic
> > conflicts with in-flight series.
> > 
> > 
> > Add support for host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed memory for VM
> > types that do NOT use support KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE (which isn't
> > precisely the same thing as CoCo VMs, since x86's SEV-MEM and SEV-ES have
> > no way to detect private vs. shared).
> > 
> > mmap() support paves the way for several evolving KVM use cases:
> > 
> >   * Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by
> >     guest_memfd [1]. This provides a unified memory management model for
> >     both confidential and non-confidential guests, simplifying VMM design.
> > 
> >   * Enhanced Security via direct map removal: When combined with Patrick's
> >     series for direct map removal [2], this provides additional hardening
> >     against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by eliminating the
> >     need for host kernel direct maps of guest memory.
> > 
> >   * Lays the groundwork for *restricted* mmap() support for guest_memfd-backed
> >     memory on CoCo platforms [3] that permit in-place
> >     sharing of guest memory with the host.
> > 
> > Based on kvm/queue.
> 
> Applied to kvm/next, thanks!

Thank you!

FWIW, I did separate run of the patches and came up with the same resolutions
for the arm64 changes, so I'm sure they're perfect ;-)