[PATCH] ARM: mm: Disregard user space addresses in BUG() address check

Ard Biesheuvel ardb at kernel.org
Fri Jan 19 03:52:21 PST 2024


On Thu, 18 Jan 2024 at 21:15, Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 04:07:34PM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb at kernel.org>
> >
> > is_valid_bugaddr() dereferences the faulting PC to fetch the instruction
> > that triggered the fault, to decide whether it is a BRK instruction used
> > to force an exception. This is used by the BUG() infrastructure to keep
> > the handling logic (which should never execute) separate from the code
> > that normally runs.
> >
> > This dereference may attempt to access user memory if the faulting PC
> > happens to contain a user address. One way this might happen is when
> > the kernel is tricked into executing from user space while PAN
> > protections (Privileged Access Never) are in effect: the instruction
> > fetch will trigger a prefetch abort, the handling of which involves a
> > check whether the instruction that caused it is a BRK, requiring a
> > load from the same address. This load is privileged too, and so it will
> > trigger another exception, which we fail to recover from.
> >
> > Given that BRK instructions tied to BUG() handling can only appear in
> > kernel code, let's check first that the PC actually points into kernel
> > memory.
> >
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> > Cc: Russell King <rmk+kernel at armlinux.org.uk>
> > Cc: Mark Brown <broonie at kernel.org>
> > Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen at huawei.com>
> > Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij at linaro.org>
> > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/202401111544.18EBB6AA%40keescook
> > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb at kernel.org>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 3 +++
> >  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> > index 3bad79db5d6e..f342bd6b2a5d 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> > @@ -402,6 +402,9 @@ int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long pc)
> >       u32 insn = __opcode_to_mem_arm(BUG_INSTR_VALUE);
> >  #endif
> >
> > +     if (pc < TASK_SIZE)
> > +             return 0;
> > +
> >       if (get_kernel_nofault(bkpt, (void *)pc))
> >               return 0;
> >
>
> Okay, I've finally had a chance to test this and it doesn't fix it
> for me. I still see the double domain fault, and I still lose a CPU.
> I patched in a pr_info() to show that the "pc < TASK_SIZE" was hitting
> (which it is) so I see:
>
>
> kdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_USERSPACE
> lkdtm: attempting ok execution at 80761b4c
> lkdtm: attempting bad execution at 76ff4000
> Unhandled prefetch abort: page domain fault (0x01b) at 0x76ff4000
> Skipping is_valid_bugaddr(76ff4000)
> Internal error: : 1b [#12] SMP ARM
> Modules linked in:
> ...
> Process cat (pid: 1301, stack limit = 0x3c8ec418)
> Stack: (0xf0975e58 to 0xf0976000)
> ...
> Backtrace:
>  lkdtm_EXEC_USERSPACE from lkdtm_do_action+0x2c/0x4c
> ...
> Exception stack(0xf0975fa8 to 0xf0975ff0)
> ...
> 8<--- cut here ---
> Unhandled fault: page domain fault (0x01b) at 0x76ff3ff0
> [76ff3ff0] *pgd=44baa835, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
> Internal error: : 1b [#13] SMP ARM
> Modules linked in:
> ...
> Process cat (pid: 1301, stack limit = 0x3c8ec418)
> Stack: (0xf0975ce0 to 0xf0976000)
> ...
> Backtrace:
>  copy_from_kernel_nofault from dump_instr+0x1cc/0x208
>  r7:f0975d27 r6:80ddf3d8 r5:f0975e08 r4:fffffffc
>  dump_instr from die+0x294/0x2f0

This is indeed a similar but different issue (as you conclude below).
dump_instr() attempts to dereference PC to generate the 'Code: xxxx
xxxx' line with the opcodes leading up to the fault, and this triggers
a PAN fault for the same reason.
...
>
> But if I comment out dump_instr(), I don't get the double fault, and the
> CPU survives. So, borrowing from Ard's patch, this fixes it for me:
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> index f342bd6b2a5d..3874afccb574 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -300,7 +300,8 @@ static int __die(const char *str, int err, struct pt_regs *regs)
>                          ALIGN(regs->ARM_sp - THREAD_SIZE, THREAD_ALIGN)
>                          + THREAD_SIZE);
>                 dump_backtrace(regs, tsk, KERN_EMERG);
> -               dump_instr(KERN_EMERG, regs);
> +               if (instruction_pointer(regs) >= TASK_SIZE)
> +                       dump_instr(KERN_EMERG, regs);
>         }
>
>         return 0;
>
>
> Is this the right approach?
>

Yes.

Not sure why Mark nor me were seeing this in testing, but obviously,
reading from user memory is not appropriate here either.

Note that there is another occurrence of this for CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y,
but I suppose that feature could be made dependent on !PAN entirely.


> Also, sticking with arm32 tradition, it seems a "cut here" is missing
> for the prefetch case:
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> index e96fb40b9cc3..df44f83c9c41 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
> @@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ do_PrefetchAbort(unsigned long addr, unsigned int ifsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
>         if (!inf->fn(addr, ifsr | FSR_LNX_PF, regs))
>                 return;
>
> +       pr_alert("8<--- cut here ---\n");
>         pr_alert("Unhandled prefetch abort: %s (0x%03x) at 0x%08lx\n",
>                 inf->name, ifsr, addr);
>

Yes, let's add that as well.



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