[PATCH v5 0/6] Add Tegra241 (Grace) CMDQV Support (part 1/2)

[Shameerali Kolothum Thodi]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg at nvidia.com>
> Sent: Monday, April 15, 2024 6:14 PM
> To: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc at nvidia.com>
> Cc: will at kernel.org; robin.murphy at arm.com; joro at 8bytes.org;
> thierry.reding at gmail.com; vdumpa at nvidia.com; jonathanh at nvidia.com;
> linux-kernel at vger.kernel.org; iommu at lists.linux.dev; linux-arm-
> kernel at lists.infradead.org; linux-tegra at vger.kernel.org; Jerry Snitselaar
> <jsnitsel at redhat.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] Add Tegra241 (Grace) CMDQV Support (part 1/2)
> 
> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 08:43:48PM -0700, Nicolin Chen wrote:
> 
> > The user-space support is to provide uAPIs (via IOMMUFD) for hypervisors
> > in user space to passthrough VCMDQs to VMs, allowing these VMs to
> access
> > the VCMDQs directly without trappings, i.e. no VM Exits. This gives huge
> > performance improvements: 70% to 90% reductions of TLB invalidation
> time
> > were measured by various DMA unmap tests running in a guest OS,
> compared
> > to a nested SMMU CMDQ (with trappings).
> 
> So everyone is on the same page, this is the primary point of this
> series. The huge speed up of in-VM performance is necessary for the
> workloads this chip is expected to be running. This series is unique
> from all the rest because it runs inside a VM, often in the from of a
> distro release.
> 
> It doesn't need the other series or it's own part 2 as it entirely
> stands alone on bare metal hardware or on top of commercial VM cloud
> instances runing who-knows-what in their hypervisors.
> 
> The other parts are substantially about enabling qemu and the open
> ecosystem to have fully functional vSMMU3 virtualization.

Hi,

We do have plans to revive the SMMUv3 ECMDQ series posted a while back[0]
and looking at this series, I am just wondering whether it makes sense to have
a similar one with ECMDQ as well?  I see that the NVIDIA VCMDQ has a special bit 
to restrict the commands that can be issued from user space. If we end up assigning
a ECMDQ to user space, is there any potential risk in doing so? 

SMMUV3 spec does say,
"Arm expects that the Non-secure Stream table, Command queue, Event queue and
PRI queue are controlled by the most privileged Non-secure system software. "

Not clear to me what are the major concerns here and maybe we can come up with 
something to address that in kernel.

Please let me know if you have any thoughts on this.

Thanks,
Shameer
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230809131303.1355-1-thunder.leizhen@huaweicloud.com/