[PATCH 4/4] arm64: fix clear_user() semantics
Mark Rutland
mark.rutland at arm.com
Tue Mar 14 04:50:30 PDT 2023
Generally, clear_user() is supposed to behave the same way as
raw_copy_{to,from}_user(), which per <linux/uaccess.h> requires:
> If raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) returns N, size - N bytes
> starting at to must become equal to the bytes fetched from the
> corresponding area starting at from. All data past to + size - N must
> be left unmodified.
>
> If copying succeeds, the return value must be 0. If some data cannot
> be fetched, it is permitted to copy less than had been fetched; the
> only hard requirement is that not storing anything at all (i.e.
> returning size) should happen only when nothing could be copied. In
> other words, you don't have to squeeze as much as possible - it is
> allowed, but not necessary.
Unfortunately arm64's implementation of clear_user() may fail in cases
where some bytes could be written, which can be demonstrated through
testing, e.g.
| # test_clear_user: ASSERTION FAILED at lib/usercopy_kunit.c:221
| too few bytes consumed (offset=4095, size=2, ret=2)
| [FAILED] 2 byte(s)
As with __{arch,raw}_copy_to_user() there are also a number of potential
other problems where the use of misaligned accesses could result in
under-reporting the number of bytes zeroed.
This patch fixes these issues by replacing the current implementation of
__arch_clear_user() with one derived from the new __arch_copy_to_user().
This only uses aligned stores to write to user memory, and reliably
reports the number of bytes zeroed.
For correctness, I've tested this exhaustively for sizes 0 to 128
against every possible alignment relative to a leading and trailing page
boundary. I've also boot tested and run a few kernel builds with the new
implementation.
For performenace, I've benchmarked reads form /dev/zero and timed kernel
builds before and after this patch, and this seems to be at least as
good (or marginally better than) the current implementation, though the
difference is very close to noise.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland at arm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro at zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas at arm.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy at arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will at kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 1 -
2 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
index a5a5f5b97b17..f422c05d8435 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
@@ -4,52 +4,171 @@
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+
#include <asm/asm-uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/assembler.h>
+
+#define USER_OFF(off, x...) USER(fixup_offset_##off, x)
- .text
+#define FIXUP_OFFSET(n) \
+fixup_offset_##n: \
+ sub x0, x3, x0; \
+ sub x0, x0, n; \
+ ret
-/* Prototype: int __arch_clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
- * Purpose : clear some user memory
- * Params : addr - user memory address to clear
- * : sz - number of bytes to clear
- * Returns : number of bytes NOT cleared
+/*
+ * Write zeroes to a user space buffer
+ *
+ * Parameters:
+ * x0 - to
+ * x1 - n
+ * Returns:
+ * x0 - bytes not copied
*
- * Alignment fixed up by hardware.
+ * Unlike a memset(to, 0, n), we need to handle faults on user addresses, and
+ * we need to precisely report the number of bytes (not) written. We must only
+ * use aligned single-copy-atomic stores to write to user memory, as stores
+ * which are not single-copy-atomic (e.g. unaligned stores, STP, ASMID stores)
+ * can be split into separate byte accesses (per ARM DDI 0487I.a, Section
+ * B2.2.1) and some arbitatrary set of those byte accesses might occur prior to
+ * a fault being raised (per per ARM DDI 0487I.a, Section B2.7.1).
+ *
+ * We use STTR to write to user memory, which has 1/2/4/8 byte forms, and the
+ * user address ('to') might have arbitrary alignment, so we must handle
+ * misalignment up to 8 bytes.
*/
-
- .p2align 4
- // Alignment is for the loop, but since the prologue (including BTI)
- // is also 16 bytes we can keep any padding outside the function
SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_clear_user)
- add x2, x0, x1
- subs x1, x1, #8
- b.mi 2f
-1:
-USER(9f, sttr xzr, [x0])
- add x0, x0, #8
- subs x1, x1, #8
- b.hi 1b
-USER(9f, sttr xzr, [x2, #-8])
- mov x0, #0
- ret
+ /*
+ * The end address. Fixup handlers will use this to calculate
+ * the number of bytes cleared.
+ */
+ add x3, x0, x1
-2: tbz x1, #2, 3f
-USER(9f, sttr wzr, [x0])
-USER(8f, sttr wzr, [x2, #-4])
- mov x0, #0
- ret
+ /*
+ * Tracing of a kernel build indicates that for the vast
+ * majority of calls to copy_to_user(), 'to' is aligned to 8
+ * bytes. When this is the case, we want to skip to the bulk
+ * copy as soon as possible.
+ */
+ ands x4, x0, 0x7
+ b.eq body
-3: tbz x1, #1, 4f
-USER(9f, sttrh wzr, [x0])
-4: tbz x1, #0, 5f
-USER(7f, sttrb wzr, [x2, #-1])
-5: mov x0, #0
- ret
+ /*
+ * For small unaligned copies, it's not worth trying to be
+ * optimal.
+ */
+ cmp x1, #8
+ b.lo bytewise_loop
- // Exception fixups
-7: sub x0, x2, #5 // Adjust for faulting on the final byte...
-8: add x0, x0, #4 // ...or the second word of the 4-7 byte case
-9: sub x0, x2, x0
- ret
+ /*
+ * Calculate the distance to the next 8-byte boundary.
+ */
+ mov x5, #8
+ sub x4, x5, x4
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(head_realign_1b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x4, #0, head_realign_2b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttrb wzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #1
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(head_realign_2b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x4, #1, head_realign_4b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttrh wzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #2
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(head_realign_4b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x4, #2, head_realigned
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttr wzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #4
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(head_realigned, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ /*
+ * Any 1-7 byte misalignment has now been fixed; subtract this
+ * misalignment from the remaining size.
+ */
+ sub x1, x1, x4
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(body, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ cmp x1, #64
+ b.lo tail_32b
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(body_64b_loop, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+USER_OFF(0, sttr xzr, [x0, #0])
+USER_OFF(8, sttr xzr, [x0, #8])
+USER_OFF(16, sttr xzr, [x0, #16])
+USER_OFF(24, sttr xzr, [x0, #24])
+USER_OFF(32, sttr xzr, [x0, #32])
+USER_OFF(40, sttr xzr, [x0, #40])
+USER_OFF(48, sttr xzr, [x0, #48])
+USER_OFF(56, sttr xzr, [x0, #56])
+ add x0, x0, #64
+ sub x1, x1, #64
+
+ cmp x1, #64
+ b.hs body_64b_loop
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(tail_32b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x1, #5, tail_16b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttr xzr, [x0, #0])
+USER_OFF(8, sttr xzr, [x0, #8])
+USER_OFF(16, sttr xzr, [x0, #16])
+USER_OFF(24, sttr xzr, [x0, #24])
+ add x0, x0, #32
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(tail_16b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x1, #4, tail_8b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttr xzr, [x0, #0])
+USER_OFF(8, sttr xzr, [x0, #8])
+ add x0, x0, #16
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(tail_8b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x1, #3, tail_4b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttr xzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #8
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(tail_4b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x1, #2, tail_2b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttr wzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #4
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(tail_2b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x1, #1, tail_1b
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttrh wzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #2
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(tail_1b, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ tbz x1, #0, done
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttrb wzr, [x0])
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(done, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ mov x0, xzr
+ ret
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(bytewise_loop, SYM_L_LOCAL)
+ cbz x1, done
+
+USER_OFF(0, sttrb wzr, [x0])
+ add x0, x0, #1
+ sub x1, x1, #1
+
+ b bytewise_loop
+
+FIXUP_OFFSET(0)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(8)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(16)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(24)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(32)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(40)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(48)
+FIXUP_OFFSET(56)
SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_clear_user)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S
index fa603487e857..9eab9ec6c71e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
#include <asm/asm-uaccess.h>
#include <asm/assembler.h>
-#include <asm/cache.h>
#define USER_OFF(off, x...) USER(fixup_offset_##off, x)
--
2.30.2
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