[PATCH v2 0/2] arm64: harden shadow call stack pointer handling
Ard Biesheuvel
ardb at kernel.org
Mon Jan 9 09:47:58 PST 2023
A couple of tweaks to the arm64 entry code to avoid loading the shadow
call stack pointer in a way that could potentially be unsafe in the
context of ROP attacks.
Changes since v1:
- rebase onto v6.2-rc1
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen at google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
Ard Biesheuvel (2):
arm64: Always load shadow stack pointer directly from the task struct
arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt
arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h | 7 ++++---
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 16 +++++++---------
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 +-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.39.0
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